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ABSTRACT 
 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSATLANTIC INVOLVEMENTS IN THE 
EMERGING WORLD ORDER: MULTILATERAL COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN 
THE BOSNIAN WAR (1992-1995) AND THE SECOND GULF WAR (2002-2003) 
 
Giray Sadõk 
  
In the aftermath of 11th September, Transatlantic involvements to international crises 
acquired new momentum. Coupled with the increasing assertiveness of the Bush 
administration, this era appears more challenging in attaining consensus over the 
international interventions to emerging crises than does the earlier post Cold War 
period. To track this trend from cohesion to chaos in Transatlantic relations and 
demonstrate the challenges to international involvements in the emerging world order, 
this study aims to comparatively analyze multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian 
War (1992-1995) and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003). To this end, the thesis 
employs Peter Viggo Jakobsens Conditions Favoring Successful Use of Coercive 
Diplomacy as thesis pertinent variables. Having the first case in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War and the second in the aftermath of 9/11 provide fertile 
ground for comparative analysis in tracing the changes in the Western discourse of 
international politics. Although these are important issues in shaping the overall strategy 
of coercive diplomacy, they also convey the misleading impression that the thesis 
centers merely on Transatlantic relations. In that regard, given the fact the Conditions 
Favoring Success of Coercive Diplomacy are interdependent, the international support 
dimension does remain particularly important, but in the end it is only one of the nine 
aspects that are outlined in the Jakobsens framework. In order to examine the 
effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in respective cases, while employing the theory of 
coercive diplomacy, this thesis begins with the introduction of the abstract model of 
coercive diplomacy, then outlines the adoption of comparative case study methodology, 
and after that concisely narrates the cases under concern and puts forward the grounds 
for coercive diplomacy for their consideration. After this elaborate grounding for 
analysis, the fourth chapter analyzes the cases under concern, and finally the conclusion 
outlines and explains the comparative findings and repercussions for further 
contemplation of the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy.     
 
 
    
ÖZ 
 
 
OLUŞAN DÜNYA DÜZENINDEKI TRANSATLANTIK MÜDAHALELERININ 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALIZI: BOSNA SAVAŞI (1992-1995) VE İKINCI 
KÖRFEZ SAVAŞINDAKI (2002-2003) ÇOK-TARAFLI KUVVET DIPLOMASISI 
  
Giray Sadõk 
 
11 Eylül sonrasõnda Transatlantik müdahaleleri yeni bir ivme kazanmõştõr. Günümüz 
Bush yönetiminin giderek artan tek yanlõlõğõ da eklendiğinde bu süreç, öncesindeki 
Soğuk Savaş sonrasõ döneme göre, ortaya çõkan krizlere uluslararasõ müdahalelerde 
bulunma konusunda fikir birliğine varmanõn güçleştiği bir evreyi göstermektedir. 
Transatlantik ilişkilerindeki uyumdan karmaşõklõğa doğru giden bu eğilimi izlemek ve 
oluşan yeni dünya düzeninde uluslararasõ müdahalelerin karşõlaştõğõ zorluklarõ 
göstermek amacõyla bu çalõşma; çok taraflõ kuvvet diplomasisinin, Bosna Savaşõ (1992 - 
1995) ile İkinci Körfez Savaşõndaki (2002 - 2003)  uygulamalarõnõ karşõlaştõrmalõ 
olarak incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, tezde Peter Viggo Jakobsenin Kuvvet 
Diplomasisinin  Başarõsõnõ Destekleyen Koşullarõ tez değişkenleri olarak kullanõlmõştõr. 
İlk vakanõn Soğuk Savaşõn, ikincisinin ise 11 Eylül sonrasõnda gerçekleşmesi, Batõnõn 
uluslararasõ siyasetteki söylem evriminin karşõlaştõrmalõ irdelenmesi için gereken zemini 
oluşturmaktadõr. Her ne kadar bu konular kuvvet diplomasisinin bütünsel stratejisini 
şekillendirmekte önemliyse de, aynõ zamanda tezin, yalnõzca Transatlantik ilişkilerine 
odaklandõğõ gibi yanõltõcõ bir izlenim de verebilir. Bu bağlamda, Kuvvet 
Diplomasisinin  Başarõsõnõ Destekleyen Koşullarõn karşõlõklõ bağlantõlõ olduğu esas 
alõndõğõnda, uluslararasõ desteğin ayrõca önemli olduğu bakidir. Ancak, netice itibariyle 
uluslararasõ destek, Jakobsenin yapõsõndaki dokuz boyuttan yalnõzca biridir. 
Kuvvet diplomasisinin ilgili vakalardaki etkinliğini irdelerken teorisini de aktarabilmek 
için tez, kuvvet diplomasisinin soyut modelinin tanõtõlmasõyla (Bölüm 1) başlar. 
Ardõndan, karşõlaştõrmalõ vaka analizi metodolojisinin uygulanmasõnõn sõralanmasõyla 
(Bölüm 2) devam eder; daha sonra da ilgili vakalarõn özet anlatõmlarõnõ ve kuvvet 
diplomasisi olarak kabul edilmelerinin temellerini (Bölüm 3) ortaya koyar. Analizin 
detaylõ olarak temellendirilmesinden sonra, Bölüm 4, ilgili vakalarõ irdeler, ve sonuç 
bölümü (Bölüm 5) ise karşõlaştõrmalõ bulgular ile  kuvvet diplomasisinin ilerideki 
teoriye ve uygulamaya yönelik çõkarõmlarõnõ sõralar ve açõklar.   
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Achieving desired outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, 
what power is for. 
 
 
Jessica Mathews 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Knowledge of coercive diplomacy remains provisional and incomplete. It will and 
should continue to be refined with the study of additional historical cases.  
Alexander L. George1 
 
This statement of George, in the following years after the end of the Cold War, 
stresses the need to study the utilization of coercive diplomacy in various international 
settings. Such elaboration would not only serve for theoretical refinement but also can 
be a promising instrument in analyzing the prospects and challenges for coercive 
diplomacy in the emerging world order. Particularly in the aftermath of 11th September 
(hereafter 9/11), after another world-shattering incident in Western policymaking, the 
study of coercive diplomacy with its emerging repercussions becomes ever more 
critical. In accordance with the essence of studying the employment of coercive 
diplomacy in the immediate aftermaths of these noteworthy episodes of modern history, 
this study aims to comparatively analyze the effectiveness of multilateral coercive 
diplomacy with regard to the selected cases. To this end, the thesis compares the 
success of multilateral coercive diplomacy between international involvements in the 
Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003).  The selected cases 
are of particular importance in tracing the convergence in Western policymaking. While 
the former one occurred in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, after the end of the 
Cold War, the latter one was in the aftermath of 9/11, a direct attack at the heart of the 
US. Therefore, these cases constitute a fruitful ground for the comparative analysis of 
coercive diplomacy in essence. The theoretical, methodological, practical, and 
comparative facets of this essence are addressed in the following parts of this study.      
 
Structure of the Thesis 
As stated at the very beginning of introduction, the thesis aims to comparatively 
analyze the success of multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian and the Second 
Gulf wars. For this purpose, the First Chapter assesses the theory of coercive 
diplomacy, its key premises and distinctive characteristics. Following this section, the 
second chapter introduces the comparative methodology, its variables, and thus sets the 
                                                 
1 George, Alexander L. 1991. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
    
stage for comparative analysis. After this theoretical and methodological presentation, 
the Third Chapter provides the concise background of the cases respectively, while 
clarifying the historical grounds for the cases to be analyzed as coercive diplomacy 
initiatives. Having these indispensable components for analysis, the Fourth Chapter 
comparatively analyzes the contemplation of coercive diplomacy according to the 
variables underlined in the second chapter. Finally, the Fifth Chapter draws conclusions 
with regards to the findings from the study.           
 
State of the Art 
A - Literature Review 
 With the aim of establishing relevance between the existing literature and this 
study, the introduction of main literature at the very beginning of the study is deemed 
indispensable. In tracing the state of the literature, the founding studies of the theory of 
coercive diplomacy are underlined with their respective contributions, and then the 
presentation of the literature flows to the more contemporary studies addressing the role 
of coercive diplomacy in dealing with more up-to-date international conflicts and their 
repercussions for theoretical refinement.   
 Thomas Schelling has set the foundations of the theory in his 1966 Arms and 
Influence, providing a systematic theoretical analysis of how states use threats of force 
to change adversaries behavior. Inspired by game theory, Schelling deductively 
develops his theoretical propositions from abstract models. While Schelling must be 
credited with building the skeleton of the theory, George is the one who refines it and 
puts empirical flesh on its bones. George employs a different research strategy than 
Schelling, namely structured, focused comparative analysis of case studies. In this 
way George inductively identifies relevant factors influencing the use of coercive 
diplomacy, and specifies the conditions under which the strategy is likely to succeed or 
fail. In his 1991 Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, 
and 1994 Limits of Coercive Diplomacy co-authored with William E. Simons, George 
comparatively analyzed the key American coercive diplomacy initiatives in history such 
as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam 1965, Nicaragua, and the First Gulf War.  
 Following George, Peter Viggo Jakobsen has improved the George & Simmons 
framework outlined in the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1994). Jakobsens objective is 
to develop a better framework for the operationalization of coercive diplomacy in 
accordance with post-Cold War realities. His research constitutes one of the key 
    
theoretical chapters of Strategic Coercion (1998), edited by Lawrence Freedman. The 
most up-to-date books regarding the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy of 
critical importance in terms of this study, are two masterpieces of our time: The 
Dynamics of Coercion (2002) by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, and The United 
Sates and Coercive Diplomacy (2003) edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin.  
The ever-developing literature on coercive diplomacy is apparently not merely 
restricted to books. The articles on contemporary coercive diplomacy can be found in 
prominent journals on international relations and conflict resolution. The ones with 
particular relevance to thesis topics, while offering fresh outlook for the development of 
the theory of coercive diplomacy and its utilization in the emerging conflicts, are 
particularly drawn attention to and categorized below in accordance with their areas of 
concern. The relevant classification of the available up-to-date literature is as follows: 
1) Bridging the Gap Articles: These are the articles that aim at theoretical 
refinement and at tailoring the existing theory of coercive diplomacy in 
accordance with the challenges of the emerging world order. Their critical 
analysis puts forward the shortcomings of the theory, while introducing the new 
challenges and alternatives to deal with them, and thus, providing the basis for 
linking the abstract model with the emerging realities of the international 
system. For that reason, the term Bridging the Gap is borrowed from Georges 
influential book title. Accordingly, the most recent articles in this category are: 
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the duration of Economic 
Sanctions (Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2004) by Fiona McGillivray 
and Allan C. Stam, The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific 
Behavioral Models of Adversaries (Comparative Strategy, Dec. 2003) by 
Alexander L. George, A Coherent Theory of Coercion? The Writings of Robert 
Pape (Comparative Strategy, Oct. 2003) by Patrick C. Bratton.  
2)  Policy Oriented Articles: These articles address international conflicts through 
utilizing the theory of coercive diplomacy as a unit of analysis or at least refer to 
coercive diplomacy as one of the principal agents in the analysis of their cases 
under concern. Given their prolificness, they are much more than those of 
elaborate theoretical studies. Thus, only the ones pertinent with the cases of this 
thesis fall under this category. These case pertinent articles are as follows: Give 
Peace a Chance, First Try Coercive Diplomacy (Naval War College Review, 
Autumn 2002) by William S. Langenheim, Preventing Deadly Conflicts: 
    
Failures in Iraq and Yugoslavia (Journal of Interdisciplinary International 
Relations, Jan 2000) by Raimo Varynen, Practicing Coercion (Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Dec. 1999) by Frank P. Harvey, The Changing Balance of 
Power in the Balkans (Peacekeeping & International Relations, Oct. 1995) by 
Maurice Marnika, Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American 
Foreign Policy (Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1999) by Barry M. 
Blechman, The Real Tran-Atlantic Gap (Foreign Policy, 2002) by , Marshall 
Bouton and Craig Kennedy. In addition, foreign policy reviews of well-
respected newspapers and magazines can be regarded as examples in this 
category: Owls are Wiser about Iraq than Hawks (Financial Times, 2002) by 
Joseph Nye, Fear of U.S. Power Shapes Iraq Debate (Washington Post, 2002) by 
Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, Iraq: The Case for Decisive Action (The 
Guardian, 2003), A New Battle over Saddam (Newsweek, 2001) by John Barry.           
As it can be traced from the literature review covering the overview of the 
prominent sources in the field from its beginning to the most recent articles and books, 
studying coercive diplomacy acquired particular momentum in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. Furthermore, this rising trend has been accelerated after 9/11 due to 
increasingly global attention on international mechanisms in dealing with aggression of 
state and non-state actors. In accordance with the flow of the thesis, the next part 
introduces the theory of coercive diplomacy and, therefore, uses books as the basic 
sources of information; Chapter 3 and 4, the background and analysis parts lean more to 
articles so as to keep on track with recent international developments as well.     
 
B - The Theory of Coercive Diplomacy  
The abstract model of coercive diplomacy is not a textbook of how-to-do-it 
prescriptions. 
Alexander L. George2 
 
As an introductory section of the thesis, this chapter aims to provide a 
theoretical foundation for the rest of the study. To this end, the chapter primarily 
responds to the need for identifying the concept of coercive diplomacy as well as to 
stress its distinctive characteristics from other types of intervention policies. In this 
                                                 
2 George, Alexander L. 1991. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
    
process, the general theory of coercive diplomacy is outlined and detailed to present a 
basis for the analysis of the selected cases. 
In such an analysis, delineating the meaning of coercive diplomacy is of 
particular importance before proceeding towards the advanced phases of the research. 
As Alexander L. George introduces the lucid and thorough definition of coercive 
diplomacy: The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back ones demand on an 
adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible 
and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand (George 1991, 4). 
Intimidation of any kind with the aim of getting others to comply with ones demands 
has been an everyday occurrence in human affairs for ages. Thus, what is referred as 
coercive diplomacy in this study has been utilized in one form or another during the 
long history of international conflicts with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, the 
refinement of such phenomenon, and thus the introduction of the concept of coercive 
diplomacy by Alexander L. George (Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an 
Alternative to War, 1991) equip international relations scholars with a comprehensive 
instrument for analyzing the conflicts of the emerging world order.   
What makes coercive diplomacy comprehensive is its context-dependent and 
flexible strategy, which enables policymakers to tailor the abstract model of coercive 
diplomacy in accordance with the particular requirements of a conflict. Although, 
threats and incentives play key roles in coercive diplomacy, communication, signaling 
and negotiating play significant roles as well. Thus, coercive diplomacy presents an 
alternative to exclusive reliance on military strategy, while taking into consideration its 
effective employment.  
In that regard, it would be of use to distinguish the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy from the traditional military strategy based on the crude use of force. The 
aim of coercive diplomacy, as it can be derived from its very definition, is not to defeat 
the enemy but rather to persuade an adversary to act in a desired manner. For that 
reason, the credibility and potency of threat are of utmost importance in determining the 
success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Thus, the use of force as an instrument of 
coercive diplomacy facilitates the compliance of an adversary and maintains the 
credibility of coercer. George points out the role of force in coercive diplomacy:  
 
If force is used in coercive diplomacy, it consists of an exemplary use of quite 
limited force to persuade the opponent to back down. By exemplary I mean the 
use of just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to 
    
protect ones interests and to establish the credibility of ones determination to 
use more force if necessary. (George 1991, 5) 
 
In fact, coercive diplomacy can be interpreted in opposition to brute force in terms of its 
projection of force and criteria for the utility of such projection. While brute force is 
designated to be employed, and thus to destroy the opponents capability to resist, 
coercive diplomacy aims to channel the adversarys capability towards the coercers 
direction without causing sheer destruction. Another prominent international relations 
scholar, Thomas Schelling, puts forward this distinction, underlining the utility of 
coercive diplomacy: Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is 
most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to 
come, that can make someone yield or comply (Schelling 1966, 3). Therefore, in 
contrast to brute force, the success of coercive diplomacy is of achieving ones demand 
with using very limited, if possible none of, the projected force.  
 The reason of the emphasis on the distinction between coercive diplomacy and 
pure coercion is to particularly underline the constructive dimension of coercive 
diplomacy that often tends to be overlooked by many. Such distinction is also crucial in 
the practice of the theory of coercive diplomacy, as this theoretical framework presents 
the opportunity to achieve ones objectives with relatively lower economic, military, 
and political costs. Furthermore, such an action is important, carrying less risk of 
inadvertent escalation of conflict as compared to the traditional military action, since in 
employing coercive diplomacy, which may already include non-military sanctions, one 
gives an adversary an opportunity to stop or back off before one resorts to military 
operations (George 1991, 6).  
 Another key distinction in defining coercive diplomacy points out how it differs 
from classical deterrence in scope and implementation, as well as how such difference 
makes coercive diplomacy more appealing as a tool for contemporary policymakers. 
Deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action 
that has not yet been initiated (Craig and George 1995, 196), whereas coercive 
diplomacy aims to stop or undo the actions that have already been undertaken by an 
adversary. Thus, coercive diplomacy is more functional in reacting to international 
crises, while deterrence aims to prevent them. Such a distinction raises the problem of 
the anticipation of potential threats in order to exercise proper deterrence. Yet as the 
identity of present-day threats has become increasingly unclear, deterrence becomes 
    
harder while coercion becomes more necessary. Particularly in the emerging world 
order where potential threats tend to have various motivations, their simultaneous 
anticipation and deterrence promise little prospect.  Even with such a prospect attained, 
potential adversaries may not be willing to get the message of the deterring power, and 
thus deterrence may fail to cease aggression. In that regard, coercive diplomacy presents 
a considerable set of alternatives from mild to severe. Such alternatives may vary from 
imposing economic sanctions (e.g. embargo, boycott) to the bombing of an adversarys 
strategic facilities.  
This wide range of alternatives makes coercive diplomacy elastic and context-
bound strategy.  However, operationalizing the theory in accordance to various conflict 
situations is challenging, since even the most refined versions of the theory of coercive 
diplomacy may fall short in analyzing dynamic world politics. As George points out, 
this task is difficult because it requires the policymaker to understand and deal with a 
number of additional contextual variables (George 1991, 14). This studys aim to 
comparatively analyze multilateral coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War (1992-1995) 
and the Second Gulf War (2002-2003) undertakes the challenging task of reformulating 
the theory of coercive diplomacy in accordance to the specific cases. To this end, the 
Second Chapter particularly concentrates on the setting up of the pertinent theoretical 
tools for analysis with the aim of tailoring the abstract model of coercive diplomacy 
towards refined, case-specific analysis.   
The above-mentioned identical characteristics of coercive diplomacy constitute 
insightful and thought-provoking approach for the analysis of the Euro-Atlantic 
multilateral involvement in international crises in order to stop or undo aggressive 
instigations in international realm. For that reason, several studies have been conducted 
on the evaluation of coercive strategy by prominent international relations scholars such 
as Alexander L. George (Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to 
War, 1991), A. L. George and Gordon A. Craig  (Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic 
Problems of Our Time, 1995), and Stephen J. Cimbala (Force and Diplomacy in the 
Future, 1992). Nevertheless, the comparative and multilateral notions have remained 
modest in these studies. Even if some of them involve certain comparisons with the 
previous American foreign policy challenges such as the Cuban Missile Crises (1962-
1963) and Vietnam (1965), due to the period in which they were conducted they lack a 
contemporary focus (i.e., the Second Gulf War) and comparative multilateral 
understanding to a certain extent (i.e., American foreign policy centered studies). In 
    
view of that absence, this research aims to bridge this gap in the analysis of coercive 
diplomacy via bringing into picture the multilateral negotiation dimension of coercive 
diplomacy and its impact on the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. 
Prior to proceeding with the introduction of the thesis pertinent variables of 
coercive diplomacy, it would be of use to underline the key characteristic of coercive 
diplomacy in terms of its analysis perspective. Such a perspective is basically the 
abstract theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure rationality on the part of the 
opponent (George 1991, 4). This premise underlines the assumption of the adversarys 
ability to receive all relevant messages, weigh them up correctly, make proper 
judgments as to the credibility and potency of the threat, and the ability to see that it is 
in its interest to comply with the projected demand. Thus, the abstract model of coercive 
diplomacy does not reflect on any kind of misperception of the adversary due to the 
values, traditions, culture, and psychological variables that may not coincide with those 
of the coercing power. Although these possibilities can have varying degrees of 
importance in different phases of conflicts, this study stays in line with the abstract 
theory of coercive diplomacy introduced in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the 
pertinent theoretical tools are set up in accordance with the abstract theory of coercive 
diplomacy. They can be classified under three main categories:  
 1) Variables of Coercive Diplomacy 
 2) Variants of Coercive Diplomacy 
 3) Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy 
The introduction of each category and their interplay constitute the basis for the analysis 
and comparison of the cases, as well as for the evaluation of the success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy in respective cases.  Thus, this introductory chapter puts forward 
the foundation for the operationalizing the abstract model of coercive diplomacy. 
 
1) Variables of Coercive Diplomacy 
Although the flexible and context-dependent notions of coercive diplomacy are 
underlined in the other relevant parts of this study as well, the task remains to introduce 
the core variables of coercive diplomacy that represent the outlook of the abstract 
model. Such a task is of particular importance in understanding and interpreting the 
logic of coercive diplomacy.  The principal concept of coercive diplomacy assumes that 
the decision-makers have four essential empty boxes (i.e., variables) to load as they 
are building any particular strategy of coercive diplomacy to apply in certain 
    
circumstances. In order to present a viable coercive diplomacy policymakers should 
consider these four fundamental variables, and thus 
 
Policymakers must decide: 
1) What to demand of the opponent; 
2) Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the 
demand; 
3) Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and 
4) Whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer 
conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the 
demand (George 1991, 7). 
 
In such process of constructing a strategy of coercive diplomacy, the characteristics of 
each variable are essential in guiding the course, and affecting the degree of success of 
coercive diplomacy. In addition to the nature of the characteristics of these key 
variables, how they are communicated to an adversary plays a crucial role in addressing 
and manipulating an adversarys degree of motivation towards compliance. Such 
manipulation is also particularly related with the coercers determination to carry out 
coercive diplomacy and ability to convey such resolution effectively to an adversary. In 
order to demonstrate the degree of resoluteness, the coercer may use both words and 
actions as principal means of communication defined in   the abstract model of coercive 
diplomacy. George points out this essence: We conclude, therefore, that the 
relationship between actions and words -the two levels of communication- is likely to 
be very important in employing the strategy of coercive diplomacy (George 1991, 10). 
 
2) Variants of Coercive Diplomacy 
Though in theory the variables are neatly defined and are rather apparent, in 
practice their interplay needs to be considered carefully. Since the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy is not a ready toolkit, and its variables are not the tools to be utilized in a 
uniform manner, the nature and order of their use present different alternatives for 
decision-makers. Depending on how policymakers deal with these four components of 
the general model, significantly different variants of the strategy are possible (George 
1991, 7). Thus, the four variables introduced in the preceding part do not constitute the 
adequate basis for the conduct of promising coercive diplomacy strategy alone. Rather, 
they provide the starting point for the elaboration of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. 
Accordingly, differences in the interplay among these variables yield five basic types of 
coercive diplomacy. George identifies these basic types as:  
    
a) The Ultimatum,  
b) The Tacit Ultimatum,  
c) The Try-and-See Approach, 
d) The Gradual Turning of the Screw,  
e) The Carrot and Stick Approach. 
 
In order to illustrate the relationship among the pertinent variables in each variant, the 
identification of the key characteristics of each variant is indispensable.  
a) The Ultimatum, also referred as classic ultimatum, constitutes the starkest variant 
of coercive diplomacy. A classic ultimatum has three components: (1) a demand on the 
opponent; (2) a time limit or sense of urgency with the compliance of the demand; and 
(3) a threat of punishment for noncompliance (George 1991, 7). Although, the 
ultimatum involves three of the four key variables in a clear-cut manner, it does not 
mean that the full-fledged ultimatum is the most effective variant of coercive 
diplomacy. As can be noticed in the subsequent parts of the thesis, the ultimatum may 
not be an appropriate or a feasible option for successful coercive diplomacy, as at the 
same time it involves certain risks of further escalating conflicts.    
b) The Tacit Ultimatum is basically not conveying in a specific manner either the time 
limit and/or the punishment for noncompliance are. Nevertheless, this should not be 
interpreted as of the tacit ultimatum is less potent, but rather as a flexible strategy for 
both a coercer and an adversary.        
c) The Try-and-See Approach: In this approach, only a single, main element of the 
classic ultimatum exists: a clear demand. It [the coercing power] takes one limited 
coercive threat or action and waits to see whether it will suffice to persuade the 
opponent before threatening or taking another step (George 1991, 8).  
d) The Gradual Turning of the Screw: The absence of time limit in the try-and-see 
approach is restored with the threat to increase pressure gradually, and carry out this 
threat incrementally. Thus, by definition the variant of the gradual turning of the screw 
relies on incremental increase in coercive pressure rather than threatening large 
escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply (George 
1991, 8). 
e) The Carrot and Stick Approach: This variant is particularly related with the 
availability of the fourth variable of coercive diplomacy, which is basically to employ 
positive inducements (i.e., carrots) for compliance alongside with retaliatory threats for 
    
non-compliance. As George puts forward eloquently, what the threatened stick cannot 
achieve by itself, unless it is a very formidable one, may possibly be achieved by 
combining it with a carrot (italics mine) (George 1991, 9). 
The combination of the four key variables and thus the formulation of relevant 
variants, identify the character of the coercive diplomacy employed. Although such 
character plays a decisive role in coercive diplomacy, the introduction of key variables 
that explains success or failure of coercive diplomacy is vital in tracking the credence of 
transatlantic discourse and the degree of accomplishment of coercive diplomacy in the 
respective cases.  
 
3) Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy 
 Since coercive diplomacy is a flexible strategy, the refinement of its evaluation 
criteria is necessary, as in its core variables and variants. Given that decision-makers are 
in need of tailoring the strategy in accordance with the situation and international 
conjuncture, the criteria for the evaluation of success or failure of coercive diplomacy 
also necessitates modification according to the unique circumstances of each case. To 
this end, different scholars have underlined a varying (though overlapping to a great 
extent) set of variables that can be utilized in the evaluation of success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy. Starting from the more recent elaboration, Seyom Brown outlined 
the potential impact of numerous variables, such as: 
! The strength and asymmetry of the motivations on both sides 
! The cooperation of coalition partners 
! The level of domestic and international support for further sacrifices 
! How each side perceives these factors to be influencing the coercive situation.  
 (Brown 2002, 453). 
   Brown takes the advantage of gathering data and driving conclusions from 
recent crises where coercive diplomacy has been employed such as the First Gulf War, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo.  As a result, he points out the specific and increasingly influential 
variables that help to explain the success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Among the 
above-mentioned variables, particularly the ones stressing the degree of cooperation 
among coalition partners and the level of international support are of significant 
importance for the analysis of this thesis in the subsequent chapters.  
    
  Though more conventional, Craig and George put forward an overlapping point of 
view by presenting the following six variables to explain the success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy:   
   Six Variables That Help to Explain Success or Failure of Coercive Diplomacy 
1. Non-zero sum view of the conflict 
2. Overwhelmingly negative image of war 
3. Carrot as well as stick 
4. Asymmetry of motivation favoring state employing coercive diplomacy  
5.  Opponents fear of unacceptable punishment for noncompliance 
6. No significant misperceptions or miscalculations (Craig and George 1995, 
210) 
  
Nonetheless, one should note that since coercive diplomacy is highly context- 
dependent (George 1991, 69), in addition to these six variables some contextual 
variables may be introduced, when the advanced research on the cases deems 
necessary.  In that regard, the variables and perspectives that are highlighting the crisis 
bargaining and multilateral negotiation dimensions of coercive diplomacy are of 
particular attention of the research. For further exploration of the impacts of multilateral 
Euro-Atlantic involvements, and the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, consideration 
of the book of Peter Viggo Jakobsen (Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the 
Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice, 1998) is of use. It contains as 
considerable recent remarks about the overall Western (i.e., American and European) 
approach to the post Cold War crises including Bosnia, but needless to say, the 
comparative aspect with regard to the Second Gulf War had not been present yet when 
his book was published. As can be observed, the dynamic nature of international 
relations constantly brings the need for the application and re-examination of existing 
theories. To this end, the research keeps in tune with recent international developments 
via effectively utilizing modern means of information technology (i.e. online databases, 
online books, journals, the Internet), in order to nourish its fresh outlook to 
methodology with the most recent relevant records.   
Conclusion 
Since, as Alexander George particularly underlines that the abstract model of 
coercive diplomacy is not a textbook of how-to-do-it prescriptions (George 1991, 
14), the theory needs to be tailored in accordance with the unique contexts of the cases. 
    
To this end, the following chapter sets the pertinent theoretical tools with the aim of 
providing a basis for analysis and comparison of the respective cases. After Chapter 2 
introduces the methodology of comparison with thesis pertinent variables, Chapter 3 
provides the concise background of the cases; Chapter 4 concentrates on the 
comparative analysis in accordance with the provided variables and backgrounds of the 
cases. Finally, Chapter 5 ends the study by underlining the conclusions of this 
comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Chapter 2 
Methodology 
Setting up the Pertinent Theoretical Tools for Analysis 
 
The way comparative research raises new questions and stimulates theory building is a 
major strength.  
W. Lawrence Neuman3 
 
  The introduction of the research design of the thesis is with the aim of depicting 
how to establish the relevance between the theory and the cases, the application of the 
theory to the cases, and accordingly the comparative examination of the cases for the 
assessment of the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy. To this end, the 
research proceeds in line with the comparative case study design, aiming to compare the 
application of the theory of coercive diplomacy in the Euro-Atlantic involvement (or 
lack of) in the Bosnian War and the Second Gulf Crisis. Thus, the design basically 
consists of: 
1. The single unit of analysis: coercive diplomacy, 
2. Two cases: the Bosnian War and the Second Gulf War.  
   Comparative researchers examine patterns of similarities and differences across 
cases and try to come to terms with their diversity (Neuman 2003, 422). Accordingly, 
the research proceeds with the assessment of the degree of the Euro-Atlantic 
involvement in each case, and the comparative analysis of the effectiveness of 
multilateral (i.e. Euro-Atlantic) coercive diplomacy with regard to the respective cases. 
Nevertheless, the research does not restrict itself with mere comparison, instead as a 
final remark, it draws conclusions with the aim of contributing to theory building and 
providing the theory with a contemporary ground for the assessment of the effectiveness 
of coercive diplomacy with reference to another critical example of the early post-Cold 
War era.     
The way comparative research raises new questions and stimulates theory 
building is a major strength (Neuman 2003, 423), since such approach contributes to 
the research for considering the similarities and differences between the cases studied. 
For that reason the cases are chosen not only on the basis of their appropriateness for 
                                                 
3 Neuman, Lawrence W. 2003. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (5th 
ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
    
the application of the theory of coercive diplomacy, but also because of the fact that 
they present fruitful grounds for comparative methodology. Such as the cases mark 
different timeframes and different regions, which can presumably bring diverse 
concerns of the parties involved in coercive diplomacy in the tenuous international 
arena of the post-Cold War era. 
 
Ground for Comparative Analysis 
 Given the apparent difference in the nature of conflicts, it would be of use to 
underline the essential reasons for comparison of the two distinct cases. On the one 
hand, the Bosnian War constitutes an example of international intervention to a 
prolonged inter-ethnic warfare between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats. On the 
other hand, the Second Gulf War can be regarded as a political-military intervention to 
prevent a dictator of acquiring WMDs and provide them to terrorist organizations.  
 Firstly, since the thesis concentrates on the Transatlantic involvements in the 
emerging world order after the Cold War, the cases serve as the cornerstones of this 
period. Beginning in 1992 the Bosnian War occurred in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War. The Second Gulf War (2002-2003), alongside of being the most recent 
available case of its kind, started a year after 9/11, another ground-breaking incident 
that undoubtedly have impact on evolving Euro-Atlantic involvement in the emerging 
crises. Thus, the occurrence periods of the cases provide fruitful ground for analysis. 
 Secondly, their regions are different, but very relevant for comparative analysis 
at the same time. On the one hand, Bosnia is in the immediate proximity to central 
Europe, thus inter-ethnic warfare in its immediate neighborhood cannot be acceptable 
for the broadening EU. On the other hand, Iraq, as one of the Gulf countries with richest 
oil reserves under the authoritarian rule of Saddam allegedly trying to acquire WMDs 
and supporting terrorism, and the neighbor of Iran that has been under American 
embargo since 1979 with similar American allegations. Thus, different regions raised 
divergent concerns on the both sides of the Atlantic in different time frames. In view of 
that, these cases constitute prolific basis for the comparative analysis of Transatlantic 
involvements in the emerging world order through enabling to trace the Transatlantic 
stance in multilateral interventions from cohesion to divergence. Indeed, even more 
critically how this evolving discourse influenced the effectiveness of coercive 
diplomacy in the cases under concern.        
 
    
Thesis Pertinent Variables 
 Having introduced the variables, variants, and conditions for success of coercive 
diplomacy, the most challenging part of the chapter remains to be presented as criteria 
for comparative analysis. Since the objective of the study is to comparatively analyze 
the effectiveness of multilateral coercive diplomacy in both cases, the variables to be 
considered are the conditions favoring successful utilization of coercive diplomacy.  To 
this end, in a preceding part of this chapter, the variables that help to explain the success 
or failure of coercive diplomacy are introduced. These variables generated by Craig and 
George, are similar to the ones put forward by George and Simons. Nevertheless, since 
the concentration of this study is on the refined framework of George and Simons 
model by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, the previous frameworks are not discussed in detail. 
Instead the Jakobsens framework is introduced below, and the reasons for its utility in 
this study are explained in the aftermath.   
 
Table 2-1: The conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy against 
adversaries who have resorted to force (Jakobsen 1998, 80). 
Success Conditions  
 
1) Clear demand  
2) Use of ultimatum  
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost  
4) Usable military options  
5) Strong leadership  
6) Domestic support  
7) International support  
8) Assurance against future demands  
9) Use of carrot 
 
Jakobsen presents this refined framework in the third chapter of 1998 Strategic 
Coercion: The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-
Cold War Realities. This title and in fact the topic it refers to constitute the major 
reason for the consideration of these conditions as variables for the comparative 
analysis in this study.  Since both of the cases occurred in the post-Cold War era, the 
framework considering the realities of this period can be presumably more conducive 
    
for comparative analysis. The increasing number of international involvements through 
coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era is also a common factor of this study with 
Jakobsens that necessitates the further refinement of the generic knowledge of coercive 
diplomacy in accordance with the emerging international conflicts.  
Beyond this main, broad reason for employing his variables, two other specific 
reasons reinforce the appropriateness of his framework for its use as basis for 
comparison in this study. In his words, I construct a framework that is applicable when 
coercive diplomacy is employed by a coalition and the opponent has resorted to some 
sort of force (Jakobsen 1998, 63). In view of the fact that both cases involve coalitional 
efforts on the coercers side, and the adversaries have resorted to aggression, Jakobsens 
conditions constitute a remarkable basis for comparative analysis. Although the cases 
have these basic characteristics in common, their degree and orientation vary 
significantly. Thus, in Jakobsens words such cases are one class of cases, and the 
focus on only one class of cases facilitates comparison across cases as the variance in 
the independent variables is minimized  (Jakobsen 1998, 70). As a result, the above-
mentioned conditions favoring the success of coercive diplomacy will constitute the key 
variables for the comparative analysis of the effectiveness (i.e. degree of success) of 
multilateral coercive diplomacy in Chapter 4.   
        
 Identifying the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy  
1) Clear Demand 
The clarity of the demand issued to the opponent by the coercer (or coercing 
coalition) plays a vital role in the introduction and implementation of the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy. Thus, clear demand is essential in building an effective strategy of 
coercive diplomacy since the form of claim serves as the opening for the coercer, in the 
form of declaring its demands. As well as another opening for the adversary in a manner 
that when it receives these demands the adversary comes to the point of responding to 
them. In this process, although the clarity of demand represents the clarity of the 
coercers objectives, clear demand becomes more essential in the effective 
communication of these objectives with the adversary. As Jakobsen points out in his 
refined framework for the success of coercive diplomacy, the clarity of the demand 
issued to the opponent rather than the clarity of the objective, as it is conceived by the 
coercer, influences the chance of success (Freedman 1998, 77). 
 
    
2) Use of Ultimatum 
 As the starkest variant of coercive diplomacy, the ultimatum is introduced in 
Chapter1. To facilitate its analysis as an effective instrument of the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy, a reminder definition would be of use: A classic ultimatum has three 
components: (1) a demand on the opponent; (2) a time limit or sense of urgency with 
the compliance of the demand; and (3) a threat of punishment for noncompliance 
(George 1991, 7). With its characteristics, the ultimatum qualifies the clear demand of 
the coercer by introducing a sense of urgency for compliance. As well as by the 
presentation of the credible threat for non-compliance, the ultimatum substantiates the 
operationalization of the clear demand, in case the adversary fails to comply. 
 
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost 
 Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost is particularly important in 
making ultimatums credible and therefore assuring the compliance with the demands of 
the coercer. Such threat potential aims to induce the adversary to prefer the coercers 
demand instead of use of force or an escalation of full-fledged warfare. Given that any 
escalation involves certain risks for both the coercer and the adversary, Following 
Pape, Huth, and Maersheimer, this [the adversary most likely to perceive escalation as 
unacceptable] is most likely to be the case if the opponent believes the coercer can 
defeat him quickly with little cost (Freedman 1998, 78). 
 
4) Usable military options 
 In order to ensure that the projected threat will be carried out, the coercer should 
have viable military options at its disposal. In that regard, for the coercer, it is not only 
sufficient to possess various military assets, but to be able to use them resolutely in any 
particular situation against the adversary. Thus, threaten to defeat the adversary with 
little cost and usable military options conditions of success are mutually reinforcing. 
Since the presence of these conditions implies that the coercer is highly motivated and 
willing to threaten and, if need be, use force. Sufficient motivation to go this far will, as 
usually be crucial for success (Freedman 1998, 78). 
 
5) Strong Leadership 
Given that the first four conditions for a successful coercive diplomacy are 
based on signaling the operational elements of the strategy, starting from the fifth 
    
condition, strong leadership, the remaining five conditions are based on building 
international consensus to attain the viable means to be employed in the promising 
strategy of coercive diplomacy. Beginning with strong leadership is of particular 
importance since it pertains the orchestration of both domestic and international support 
to the ends and the means of the coercer. To facilitate analysis, the realization of the 
domestic and international support is separately analyzed under the following 
conditions. Thus, the strong leadership component focuses on the coercer management 
of the conflict situation by taking into account its domestic and international 
dimensions, while leaving the analysis of each to the following sections. When the 
coercer consists of a coalition or when the coercing state has to build a coalition,  
decision-making becomes harder as the number of states that have to agree goes up 
(Freedman 1998, 77). Not surprisingly, each state tends to perceive a threat emanating 
from a given conflict differently; thus each states will to use force vary accordingly. 
 
6) Domestic Support 
 Acquiring and maintaining domestic support is crucial for the ability of any 
coercer to threaten, and use force, if necessary. Lacking domestic support may risk the 
sustainability of any coercive effort and thus ultimately lead to an ineffective 
implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, if not to its failure. Generally, the 
maintenance of domestic and international support goes hand in hand. For that reason, 
the leading state faces the difficult task of having to present a convincing case for 
threatening the use of force on its own public as well as to the other governments in the 
coalition (Freedman 1998, 77). Accordingly, the thesis pays particular attention not 
only to the domestic support of the leading coercer (i.e. the US), but also to the 
respective public opinions of the remaining states in the multilateral involvement. To be 
more specific in that regard, domestic support refers to mainly the opinions of the 
respected audiences about the handling of crisis situations (i.e., the Bosnian War and the 
Second Gulf War), and whether they were worth to engage in any coercive effort that 
can trigger full-fledged warfare. Perhaps for that reason, domestic support tends to be 
affected by the opinion of wider international community in a manner that sometimes its 
maintenance proves to be contingent upon the assurance of multilateral consent, if not 
support (i.e., the Second Gulf War).   
 
 
    
7) International Support  
Prior to engaging any attempt of coercive diplomacy the search for international 
support is deemed essential for assuring the isolation of the adversary and therefore to 
make the coercive strategy more effective with low-cost and a quick period of 
involvement. Agreement is easier to reach in a situation where a direct threat to 
international security (i.e., gross human rights violations-Bosnia, WMD, terror-Iraq) 
leaves little room for maneuver than in a situation of low threat where the room for 
maneuver and hence the possibility for disagreement is greater. Nevertheless, states 
even though from the same alliance (i.e., NATO), may sharply diverge over their threat 
perceptions. Therefore, attaining international support may not be guaranteed although 
there is a direct threat to international security, as long as the international community 
lacks consensus over the nature of the threat and the means to counter it. In that regard, 
the nature and scope of international support is of critical importance in terms the 
cohesion and credibility of the coercing coalition. 
 With the aim of operationalizing such a broad concept of international support, it 
would be of use to state its principal scope in the remainder of the thesis. First of all, it 
should be underlined that international support refers primarily to the consent of 
international community through the UN Security Council in general, and under the 
framework of other international organizations with rather regional focus in particular 
such as the EU and NATO. Given the fact that this thesis is concerned with the 
Transatlantic involvements in the emerging world order, the particular attention is paid 
on tracing the convergence and divergence among the members of Transatlantic 
community in various settings such as the UN Security Council, the EU and NATO. In 
addition, at the further level international support refers to an active international 
engagement such as contributing with troops to the intervention (e.g., Rapid Reaction 
Force, composed by the European troops in the Bosnian War) and sharing the economic 
burden of the war (e.g., the First Gulf War). Thus, in some cases it refers to active 
engagement (i.e., the Bosnian War), while in the others bare multilateral consent can be 
sufficient (i.e., the Second Gulf War), but even more challenging to attain.  
 
8) Assurance against future demands  
Assurance against future demands is critical in bringing adversary to the table, 
as well as in convincing him that the coercers demands will not be a prelude to 
potential further demands. A successful strategy of coercive diplomacy involves a 
    
certain degree of cooperation (i.e., not to escalate) of the adversary, regardless of being 
persuaded or enforced.  As Schelling has pointed out, an opponent will not comply 
with the coercers demand if he fears that it will result in new demands in the future 
(Schelling 1966, 74).  In such a case, the adversary may choose to fight till the end even 
though all of the remaining conditions are fulfilled, and are perceived potent enough by 
the opponent since he would regard the strategy of coercive diplomacy as a mechanism 
for extracting concessions.   
 
9) Use of carrot 
Although the principal strategy of coercive diplomacy aims to induce the 
adversary to comply with the demands of the coercer based on the credibility of threats 
and their effective communication and thus the persuasion of adversary, the use of 
carrot can be of essential complementarity. As Jakobsen puts forward its role, while 
use of carrot cannot be regarded as strictly necessary for success, evidence indicates that 
coupling a threat to use force with some sort of carrot enhances the scope for success 
considerably (Freedman 1998, 79). 
 
Conclusion 
 The preceding chapters (i.e., Chap. 1 and 2) of the thesis present the theoretical 
basis of the thesis. This basis is employed for the analysis and comparison of the cases. 
The first chapter introduces the theoretical abstract model of coercive diplomacy, while 
providing remarks about its distinctive characteristics. Thus, Chapter 1 draws the 
boundaries of the theoretical concept of coercive diplomacy, and identifies the logic of 
coercive diplomacy. 
 In view of the fact that coercive diplomacy is a loaded concept, the second 
chapter refines the abstract model of coercive diplomacy and sets the ground for 
analysis.  In this process, the refinement of the theory goes hand in hand with the 
introduction of the logic of the thesis. Hence, the second chapter weaves theory with 
methodology and approaches this study by highlighting the pertinent parts of both, and 
adding the particular remarks on their interaction when necessary. For that reason, given 
that this chapter seals the theoretical introduction and refinement part of this study, the 
in-depth consideration of the definitions and characteristics of coercive diplomacy are 
of major importance in terms of the analysis and comparison of the respective cases in 
the subsequent parts of this study.  The variables introduced in this chapter may neither 
    
be present in each case, nor referred to any particular situation of the cases. However, 
their presentation in the very beginning of this study can provide readers a 
comprehensive illustration of the abstract model with its variables, variants, and criteria 
for evaluation. As a result, the reader becomes acquainted with the principal logic of 
how coercive diplomacy works in theory, and thus ready for the elaboration on its 
practice. Accordingly, Chapter 3 presents the respective backgrounds of the cases and 
establishes historical and factual relevance with multilateral coercive diplomacy 
involvements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Chapter 3 
A Concise Description of the Cases: Bosnian War and the Second Gulf War 
 
Coercive diplomacy is a sharp tool 
Disaster is always a single bad decision away 
 
Alexander L. George4 
Introduction  
Having introduced the abstract model and the pertinent theoretical tools for 
analysis, presentation of the cases remains essential in blending the theory of coercive 
diplomacy with contemporary multilateral involvements.  To this end, this chapter aims 
to provide a consecutive description of each case. The description of each case begins 
with the establishment of relevance for the application of coercive diplomacy in its 
contemplation. A brief narrative of each conflict follows this part. In this process, the 
significant international involvements and their impacts on the process and outcome of 
the conflicts are underlined. Given that the cases are introduced in chronological order 
as well, the following part is on the concise description of the Bosnian War (1992-
1995). 
 
I. Bosnian War (1992-1995) 
Some say we were brought to the brink of war. Of course we were brought to the brink 
of war. To get the brink without getting into the war is the necessary art. 
 
John Foster Dulles5 
Ground for Coercive Diplomacy 
This part aims to put forward why the multilateral involvements in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) constitute an example of coercive diplomacy. To this 
end, the reasons for and the means of the employment of coercive diplomacy by the 
United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and finally 
by the Contact Group are discussed.  
 It took three long years of continued fighting in Bosnia for the gradual 
emergence of international response to evolve from wavering to resolute. In this 
                                                 
4 Craig, Gordon, and Alexander L. George, eds. 1995. Force and Statecraft: DiplomaticProblems of Our 
Time (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
5 Quoted in Bell, Coral, 2003. Iraq, Alliances, and Crisis Management. Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 57, No: 2. 
    
process, various mechanisms ranging from vague threats of future action to ultimatums, 
and positive inducements have been utilized. As the emerging hegemon in the 
immediate aftermath of Cold War, the United States (US) played a key role in all 
attempts, employing coercive diplomacy in order to halt the Serbian aggression in 
Bosnia.      
 Over the course of the war, the Unites States had participated five attempts to 
use the threat of force to persuade or compel the Bosnian Serbs to cease certain actions 
(Art and Cronin 2003, 60). Each attempt involves certain threat projection with varying 
degree of commitment to back up the coercers demand, if the adversary fails to 
comply. Thus, as it can be observed in the following attempts, the variants of coercive 
diplomacy can be tailored according to the local situations and therefore may not be as 
clear-cut apparent as in the abstract model. Nevertheless, in the contemplation of these 
attempts the general logic of coercive diplomacy in-depth discussed in Chapter 1, shall 
be considered as guiding in the outlook of tracing multilateral coercive diplomacy in 
Bosnian War. 
 First, in response to the strangulation of Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) by Serb forces surrounding the city in the summer of 1993, NATO 
issued a vague threat of future action against those who attacked UN forces or 
obstructed humanitarian aid (Art and Cronin 2003, 60). This ambivalent warning can 
be characterized as the emerging version of the try-and-see variant of coercive 
diplomacy, or even more to the point as the gradual turning of screw, since it lacks 
certain threat of punishment for non-compliance while stresses the future action.  
 Second, as a result of overt violation of the first demand about the safety of 
Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs shelling the marketplace in February 1994, for the US 
and its NATO allies responded by issuing an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw their 
heavy weapons from around the city or face an air attack by NATO  (Art and Cronin 
2003, 60). This threat led the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weapons from 
around the city and to the establishment of a heavy weapons exclusion zone around 
Sarajevo. With its means and outcomes this can be considered as a successful (yet 
partially effective, since war is continuing), act of coercive diplomacy that displayed 
most of the theoretical characteristics identified by Alexander George.  
   Third, in April 1994 three limited air strikes were conducted against Serb 
forces attacking the Muslim-held enclave of Gorazde. These air strikes were followed 
by another ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw and by at least some consideration of a 
    
more extensive use of force against them (Art and Cronin 2003, 60).  Such 
combination of the increasing imminent threat for non-compliance with the actual use 
of force corresponds to Georges notion of exemplary use of quite limited force to 
persuade the opponent to back down (George 5, 1991) that has also been discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
 Fourth, in November 1994 NATO launched air attacks against Serb air base 
and three Serb SAM missile sites in the Bihac area in response to Serb attacks that 
threatened to overrun the Muslim-held enclave in western Bosnia (Art and Cronin 
2003, 61). Again, it can be noted that the exemplary use of force with the aim of 
establishing credibility with regard to the adversary is essential if coercive diplomacy is 
going to bear fruit.  
 Fifth, the use of air power against Bosnian Serb ammunition dump in May 
1995, in order to back up an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw weapons from 
the exclusion zone around Sarajevo (Art and Cronin 61, 2003). This attempt, though a 
final one, was not a one-shot game but rather an ongoing strategic air offensive until the 
Dayton Peace Accords attained in November 1995. This final attempt and its 
repercussions revealed the apparent counter-productiveness (i.e., as a retaliation to air 
strikes the Serbs seized UN personnel as hostages to use them as human shields against 
possible further attack) of the UN mission in Bosnia, and thus paved the way for its 
collapse, and therefore reinforcing comprehensive US strategy of multilateral coercive 
diplomacy.  
 
Concise Narrative 
The war in Bosnia started in earnest after the European Community (EC) 
recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state on April 1992 (Oudraat. 1999, 45). At the same 
time, the Bosnian Serbs began to the siege of Sarajevo. With its multi-ethnic and multi-
religious composition, the city became the symbol for the struggle of a unitary Bosnian 
state from the very beginning. By May 1992 the situation in Sarajevo became 
increasingly dangerous; it prompted the UN to move most of its UNPROFOR personnel 
to Zagreb.   
During the summer of 1992, the eastern, northern, and northwestern parts of 
Bosnia underwent systematic ethnic cleansing. Within a few months, Serbs occupied 
close to 70 percent of Bosnia (Oudraat. 1999, 46). Rather than this vast and rapid 
invasion, the means employed by Serbs towards occupation contributed to the growing 
    
public dissent from atrocities conducted at the immediate backyard of the EU. As 
indiscriminate killings of civilians, concentration camps, and organized rape became 
known in the West, demands for forceful military action were articulated. To respond 
to the public outrage over the war in Bosnia, the UN Security Council declared the 
establishment of a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992 (Oudraat. 1999, 47). But it 
took until April 1993 for NATO to begin enforcing it. 
 During the entire course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) various peace 
attempts have been carried out at different phases of the conflict. These peace efforts 
can be categorized in accordance with the nature of the intermediaries involved:   
 
A  International Organizations 
1) The European Community (EC) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). Mediators: Jose Cutiliero and Lord Carrington. (February-
August 1992) 
2)  The United Nations (UN) and EC. Mediators: Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen 
(September 1992  June 1993); Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen. (July 
1993 - December 1993) 
B  States  
1) The US involved mediation (i.e.: the Contact Group, Dayton Process). 
Mediators: Charles Redman, Richard Holbrooke (February 1994  November 
1995).  
 
A  International Organizations 
1) EC & CSCE Mediation: Aware that it did not have the justification to interfere in 
Eastern Europe, the EC went before the CSCE to seek approval for its actions. The 
CSCE was very supportive of the EC diplomatic initiatives (Raymond, 1993). With the 
aim of facilitating the Bosnians in finding a way to become independent from 
Yugoslavia while resolving ethnic tensions, the EC initiated talks with the three ethnic 
Bosnian leaders in January 1992. The EC under Lord Carrington recommended the 
creation of a loose federation of three ethnic regions as a way of forestalling a potential 
bloody conflict: 
The EC/CSCE attempt remained practically ineffective in preventing the 
Bosnian conflict from escalating and negotiating a peaceful settlement once the 
crisis broke out. The EC had no credible capability to respond to the Bosnian 
conflict. Beyond the EC's political and diplomatic capabilities in solving 
    
regional crises remained relatively undeveloped, the fact that the EC had no 
military might could partially explain the ease with which the Bosnian leaders 
ignored the EC's efforts (Raymond, 1993). 
 
2) UN & EC Mediation: As the Bosnian Muslim leaders began calling for UN 
peacekeeping6 efforts around March 1992, the UN responded by passing its first 
resolution that expanded the Croatian UNPROFOR humanitarian mission to Bosnia. 
The next series of resolutions, passed during the early summer, focused on expanding 
UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo and imposing sanctions against the former 
Yugoslavia. (Raymond, 1993).  Nevertheless, as these UN measures proved to be 
unproductive in stalling Serbian aggression, an introduction of a new peace proposal 
was perceived as inevitable. As a result, the UN and EC negotiators presented a plan to 
the three Bosnian ethnic leaders calling for partitioning Bosnia into a loose federation 
composed of 7-10 sectors with limited autonomy. (Raymond, 1993).  Since, this was a 
compromise solution that satisfied none of the parties at all, it failed. However, the 
underlying reason of its failure was primarily because the three warring parties in 
Bosnia were aware that the mediators had no political backing and that they had more 
than one master to please (Atiyas, 1995). 
The second UN/EC attempt, carried out by Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord 
Owen, was based on the plan for a Union of United Bosnian Republics, a combination 
of the Serb-Croat initiative for confederation and the platform of the Bosnian 
presidency advocating a federal state (Atiyas, 1995). Despite the two sided 
compromise proposal and manipulative strategies of the mediators, such as the 
establishment of the International Conference on the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
new platform for the negotiations, the plan failed due to the similar reasons, if not 
identical with those of the Vance-Owen plans: 
A fairer criticism of the European policy would be that, having encouraged 
Bosnia to seek recognition in these circumstances, it gave the Bosnian 
government no security guarantees, and even encouraged the Serb-led federal 
army to move men and material out of Croatia onto Bosnian soil. But this was a 
failure for which the whole of Europe, and the UN, must take responsibility. 
(Malcolm, 1994) 
 
                                                 
6 The UN defines peacekeeping as a presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties 
concerned. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict 
and the making of peace. Peacekeeping works to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has 
been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. (UN Peacekeeping, 
1993) 
    
During 1993, calls for outside military intervention became more determined in 
Western Europe and North America. However, Western governments could not agree 
on a course of action, and their reaction to the war in Bosnia remained restricted to the 
passing of resolutions whose implementation proved to be highly contentious and 
problematic.  
 
B  States 
1) The US Involved Mediation: The breakthrough in international involvement 
came with the US diplomatic efforts to sustain the Croat-Muslim alliance came after the 
February 1994 Sarajevo market attack. In its aftermath NATO issued its first serious 
threat to launch air strikes, but fell short of massively intervening on the side of Bosnian 
government.  
Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed a federation agreement on 18 March 1994, 
which stipulated that the armed forces of both sides were to be under unified 
command. Finally, Izetbegovic and Tudjman signed an agreement that linked 
the new Bosnian federation to Croatia. (Oudraat. 1999, 42) 
 
Corresponding to these developments on the ground, a Contact Group composed 
of the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia replaced the stalled EU-UN 
negotiations. It held its first meeting in April 1994 and came forward with a new peace 
plan in July 1994. The plan called for 51 percent of Bosnian territory to go to the Croat-
Muslim federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs.     
In the early spring of 1994, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and 
Germany established a five-nation Contact Group, with the objective of brokering a 
settlement between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group based its 
efforts on three main principles:  
1. Bosnia would remain as a single state within internationally recognized borders, 
2. That state would consist of the Bosniak/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity, 
3. These two entities would be linked through mutually agreed constitutional principles 
that would involve relationships with Serbia and Croatia proper as well.  
In July 1994, the Contact Group put forward a proposed map presenting a 51/49 
percent territorial compromise between the Federation and Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian, 
    
Croatian, and Serbian Governments all accepted the proposal. The Bosnian Serbs 
repeatedly rejected it. This rejection was particularly related with the Serbian perception 
of the ineffectiveness of the credibility of any threat posed by the international 
community. Presumably, under such conditions, the achievement of the peace efforts on 
table is not promising unless decisive maneuvers carried out on the ground.  As the US 
mediator Richard Holbrooke emphasized ...as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs 
to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but 
success on the battlefield (Holbrooke 73, 1998). 
Not surprisingly, fighting in Bosnia had picked up in March 1995, when 
Bosnian government forces initiated offensives around Travnik and Tuzla (Oudraat 
1999, 51). Bosnian Serbs countered with increased pressure on Sarajevo in early May 
1995. Several UN-heavy-weapon collection points were overrun. In response, NATO 
initiated air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Particularly, an attack on the Sarajevo 
marketplace on 28 August 1995 provided NATO the excuse to show its resolve. A two-
week bombing campaign against Serb targets followed (Oudraat 1999, 51). The NATO 
air campaign also helped Croat and Bosnian government forces, which came close to 
overrunning Banja Luka, the Serb stronghold in the north of Bosnia. The battlefield 
successes of the Muslim-Croat alliance supported by NATO air strikes provided a 
realistic basis for division in accordance to the US-led Contact Group plan. With the 
aim of negotiating the plan without further exacerbating the prolonged conflict, a 
comprehensive peace settlement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, from 1-21 November 
1995 and signed in Paris in the following month. The agreement stated that: 
Bosnia would remain a single nation within present borders containing two 
republics: The Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic. The 
country would remain under a central government with a rotating presidency, a 
constitution and an elected parliament. The Bosnian-Croat Federation would 
control 51 percent of territory; The Bosnia Serb republic would control the 
remaining 49 percent. Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, would remain united under the 
control of the Bosnian-Croat Federation. (CNN, 1995) 
 
 
 
 
    
II. The Second Gulf War (2002-2003)* 
If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long. 
George W. Bush7 
Ground for Coercive Diplomacy 
 Although, the US involvement in Iraq and its international repercussions 
significantly differ from that of Bosnia, this does not necessarily preclude its 
consideration as a case for coercive diplomacy. As this part of the thesis embarks on the 
reasons for the contemplation of coercive diplomacy in the process of dealing with the 
Second Gulf Crisis, it begins with the statement of the coercers (i.e., the US) motives 
for the employment of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, and substantiates the 
argument through the depiction of the implementation of the basic variants of coercive 
diplomacy introduced in Chapter 1. 
 In view of the fact that the US has been the principal coercer since the First Gulf 
Crisis of 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, analyzing the emerging motivations of the 
US towards Iraqi regime in post-9/11 remains essential. Although Saddam is forced to 
back from Kuwait and was contained to a certain degree with economic sanctions, UN 
weapon inspectors and no-fly zones that required limited US existence in the region, 
which was the necessity of further step that emboldens coercive diplomacy and 
consequently led to the current full-fledged war and Iraqi occupation. 
 Addressing this fundamental question will provide the essence of the US 
motives for employing coercive diplomacy until the end that leads to the full-fledged 
war and the occupation of Iraq.  As much as the impact of the 9/11 on the US foreign 
policy, the analysis of the threat perception of the respective US government (i.e., the 
Bush administration) and the chosen means for the response to the perceived threat 
remains essential in such elaboration.  
A year after 9/11, the Bush Administration issued its first National Security 
Strategy in September 2002. The Chapter V of the document summarizes the 
Administrations approach to using force, known as the Bush Doctrine. Driving an 
apparent lesson from the 9/11, the doctrines definition of threat is based on the 
combination of radicalism and technology (Record 2003, 4). To be more specific, 
radicalism in terms of rogue states that are willing to support attacks on the American 
                                                 
* Indeed this was the 3rd war in the Gulf, starting with 1981-1988 Iran-Iraq War, 1990-1991 Iraqi Invasion 
of Kuwait and the most recent US-led War against Iraq. But given the focus on the US-led multilateral 
involvements, the recent war is referred by many as the Second Gulf War.  
7 Quoted in Record, Jeffrey. The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq. 2003. 
    
homeland via either equipping the terrorist networks with WMD, or generating 
alternative means for delivery (i.e., ballistic missiles as Iraq attained progress to a 
certain degree). As the US President George W. Bush proclaimed this stance in his 
West Point speech on June 1, 2002: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the 
crossroads of radicalism and technology (Record 2003, 4).   After having declared the 
nature of the threat that sounds considerably different from the already existing Cold 
War threat perceptions, the doctrine embarks on the means of dealing with this threat. 
Not surprisingly, the nature of response involves significant differences from the 
previous strategies as well. Thus, the fundamental Cold War strategies such as 
deterrence and containment are losing their relevance according to the doctrine. The US 
President George W. Bush particularly underlines this perception signaling the necessity 
for alternative strategies in dealing with this emerging threat: Containment is not 
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those 
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies (Record 5, 2003). 
Therefore, the Bush Doctrine identifies a multifaceted, undeterrable and unprecedented 
threat to the US, by implication that such threat demands an unprecedented response as 
well.        
The above-mentioned key premises of the Bush Administration are essential in 
illustrating the US threat perceptions that would lead to the formulation of the specific 
demands, and response strategies that could be employed in case of non-compliance. As 
introduced in the first chapter, the demand and punishment for non-compliance are the 
fundamental elements in the implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. In 
this regard, the US-led coercive diplomacy has two objectives, interrelated but distinct, 
Iraqi disarmament and regime change (Langan 1, 2002).  Since the disarmament of 
Saddams regime would lead to gradual decline of its control over Iraq, the regime 
change might occur internally without necessitating American direct military 
involvement. To realize both of the US objectives one way or another, coercive 
diplomacy seems the most promising strategy, since it is the only option that holds out 
the prospect of reducing the Iraqi threat without war, while actually reinforcing the 
United States should war actually occur (Keohane 1, 2002). The underlying reason of 
Keohanes claim reveals also one of the fundamental objectives of any American 
attempt to employ coercive diplomacy against Iraq. As Wright points out in his earlier 
remarks: this [American attempt] would be to tilt global public relations back in its 
favor by demonstrating that its immediate objective is the unconditional implementation 
    
of SCR 687, which defined the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire in 1991 but has not yet 
been fully implemented (Wright 1, 1998). This tactic would place the burden of shame 
for noncompliance on Saddams regime. 
Through this maneuver, the US objective emerges as to shift the burden for the 
Iraqi peoples suffering away from the UN sanctions and onto Saddam with the aim of 
depriving him from its favorite maneuver for international support. To this end, at the 
end of March 2002 Russian and American diplomats resolved a year-long standoff over 
smart sanctions- sanctions designed to have more impact upon the regime and less on 
the general Iraqi population- by permitting the passage of SCR 1409 in May (Baker, 
2002). According to Langenheim, with this development, it is now possible for the 
United States to employ coercive diplomacy to once and for all bring about Iraqi 
compliance with SCR 687 (Langenheim, 2002). For such an effort, the gradual 
turning of the screw approach is the most appropriate, with smart sanctions serving as a 
form of carrot (to engender not only allied cooperation, but also possibly the support 
of opposition within the Iraqi regime). Since in this variant the time pressure is not an 
overt one as in ultimatum, the clarity of the coercers demand becomes even more 
essential. Thus, the US has to clearly convey to the Security Councils permanent 
members, its European allies, and regional partners that Iraqi compliance with all 
existing Security Council resolutions must be full and unconditional. To this end, the 
Bush Administration even threatened Saddams regime with unilateral action. This 
threat is not only to Saddam, but even more so to international opposition. Conveying 
this readiness for unilateralist American action increased the pressure on the UN 
Security Council with regards to rigorous inspections. The unanimous resolution 1441 
passed by the UN Security Council in November 2002 is of particular significance in 
terms of the success of the US coercive diplomacy towards the effective disarmament of 
Saddams regime. Although not authorizing immediate use of force in case of non-
compliance, this resolution was claimed to be the source of legitimacy for the US action 
by the proponents of the Bush administration. Through this achievement the screw 
turned against Iraq at diplomatic realm, by securing international consensus for tougher 
measures. Therefore it can be argued that the unilateralist rhetoric of the Bush 
Administration is convenient with multilateral coercive diplomacy, since as Keohane 
points out: without a credible threat unilateral action, it is hard to imagine the Security 
Council taking such tough measures against Iraq (Keohane 1, 2002). Although 
there are a variety of dangers in making an ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq 
    
such as an adversary may respond with conditional or partial acceptance, prompting 
calls for negotiations or third-party mediation (George 73, 1991). Because these 
reasons led to an ever-increasing degree of disagreement in the UN Security Council, 
and even among NATO allies, any ultimatum is not to be issued without difficulty. 
Nevertheless, some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply coercive 
diplomacy against Iraq, since Saddam was never likely to yield to anything but 
convincing threat or actual war (Bell 226, 2003). Consequently, the US and Britain tried 
to pass a second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but given the 
staunch opposition from Russia, France, Germany and China they first postponed, then 
abandoned the proposition for such still birth resolution. Instead, together with the 
Spanish Prime Minister they decide to give a final 24 hours for the immediate and 
unconditional disarmament of Saddam Hussein. As the US President Bush points in his 
final remark before the first day of the war: Tomorrow is the day that we can 
determine whether or not diplomacy will work (Ohio, 2002).   
 
Concise Narrative 
 Although this part of the study discusses the Second Gulf War and its 
international repercussions, the history of American coercive diplomacy in the region 
can be traced back to more than a decade ago since the First Gulf War of 1991. This 
long period of the wavering US involvement in the Gulf after the decisive First Gulf 
War is illustrated with all relevant details in the chapter of Jon. Alterman (Coercive 
Diplomacy against Iraq, 1990-98) in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy 
(Eds. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin). 1998 marks the year when the UN (i.e., 
UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors left 
the country. After their return under the US-led Security Council resolution 1382 in 
2002 under the refreshed title, UNMOVIC, Iraq repeatedly stressed that it had 
completed its disarmament obligations, and obstructing the weapons inspectors. 
However, as Jessica T. Mathews points out, as the United States stepped up its threat 
to change the Iraqi regime by force, the Iraqi leadership resumed dialogue with 
Secretary-General Annan, hinting at the possibility of accepting inspections (Mathews 
2002). Although, this approach is interpreted by France, Russia and Germany as 
Saddams willingness to comply with the UN resolutions, it failed to generate the 
similar outcome in Washington. As the US President George W. Bush clearly declares 
the discontent of his administration in October 2002, The entire world has witnessed 
    
Iraqs eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith (Ohio, 2002). Thus, 
according to the Bush Administration, the Iraqi stance with regards to the new 
inspections is nothing more than another maneuver to divert international consensus on 
tightening and enforcing the inspections, and thus ensuring the disarmament of the Iraqi 
regime. Particularly in that regard the employment of coercive diplomacy is 
instrumental. Since, the threat is not only necessary push Saddam for full compliance 
with the UN resolutions, but also to press the international community to take step in 
their enforcement, or at least avoid their potential opposition in any unilateral American 
action.           
The final report of the latest Chief UN Weapons inspector Hans Blix provides 
ground for an American action, to back up its demand. Blix notifies the UN Security 
Council that I naturally feel sadness that 3 months of work carried out in Iraq have not 
brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or 
other proscribed items in Iraq (italics mine) (Iraq chronology, 2003). Predominantly, 
the Iraqi recalcitrance during the negotiations on and the process of inspections plays 
critical role in such report, and thus its interpretation in an according manner by the 
Bush Administration. 
Despite this final report supporting the adamant American stance for regime 
change in Iraq for (at least reportedly) securing its disarmament in accordance with the 
UN Security Council resolutions, Saddam still plays on the divergence in the UN 
Security Council, as well as among the US allies.  On 19 March 2003, Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein appears on national television and rejects the US ultimatum (Iraq 
chronology, 2003). Given the fact that France, Russia and Germany issue a joint 
declaration, saying there was no justification for a war on Iraq and that UN weapons 
inspections were working, this could not prevent the US from realizing regime change 
through the occupation of the entire country. As Keohane underlines Credibility is 
necessary to make threats that matter (Keohane 1, 2002). 
 
Conclusion  
 As the background chapter of the thesis, this chapter filled the theoretical 
skeleton with empirical flesh. This process has not only been the one of mere story 
telling, but rather the one that underlines the fundamental facts that constitute the 
ground of the consideration of the cases concerned. Such ground is not only essential in 
tracing the contemplation of coercive diplomacy properly, but also critical in 
    
conducting a competent comparative analysis. This analysis will be the subject of the 
following chapter (Chapter 4), which comparatively examines coercive diplomacy 
involvements in accordance with the thesis pertinent variables presented in Chapter 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Chapter 4 
Analyzing the Success Conditions for Coercive Diplomacy  
 
[Coercive Diplomacy] is like a scalpel, it can cut off a diseased organ in the hands of a 
skilled surgeon or it could maim and even kill. 
P. G. Thakurta8 
Introduction  
 After completing the brief narratives of the cases, now the stage becomes ready 
for analysis. The aim of this chapter is to examine the conditions for success introduced 
in Chapter 2 with regards to the contemplation of coercive diplomacy in respective 
cases. To this end, the chapter begins with the analysis of the each of the success 
conditions for coercive diplomacy in the Bosnian War, and continues with 
contemplation of the same structure for the Second Gulf War. Since this chapter is 
designated to establish a factual ground for comparative analysis, only the condition-
specific (i.e., 9 success conditions) incidents and their pertinent remarks are raised up to 
substantiate the analysis and facilitate drawing conclusions in the final chapter (Chapter 
5). For that reason, neither this chapter nor the thesis intends to provide a detailed 
observation and narrative of the respected cases. Even Chapter 3 of case descriptions is 
focused to this end. Therefore, Chapter 4 seeks to underline and analyze the specific 
incidents during the respective conflicts that constitute one (or more) of conditions for 
success in coercive diplomacy.        
 
Analyzing the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy in the Bosnian War 
1) Clear Demand 
 Although, clear demand is indispensable for a theoretically sound and practically 
effective strategy of coercive diplomacy, achieving that clarity in practice may not be 
politically preferable, particularly in the complex conflict situations such as the Bosnian 
War. As it can be traced in the following conditions for success, the asymmetric 
motivations of the coercing parties (i.e., Western governments, NATO, finally the 
Contact Group) and the Bosnian Serbs made it difficult, if not impossible to issue clear-
cut demands until the ending phases of the conflict. James Gow puts forward this split 
between the success conditions of the theory, and the imperatives on the ground in 
                                                 
8 Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, <http://www.rediff.com/money/2002/jun/29paran.htm>[cited on 3/7/2004]. 
    
Bosnia and the reluctance of international community towards an active involvement to 
the conflict:   
 
Schellings notion of compellance, in which clear demands are made, a defined 
period for its fulfillment established and the consequences of non-fulfillment 
impressed upon the coercee, may be less appropriate in situations such as that in 
former Yugoslavia where the attempted use of coercive mechanisms was in the 
first place a reflection of asymmetric interests, motivations, commitments, and 
resources. (Freedman 1998, 277) 
 
 As such asymmetry at varying degrees becomes increasingly apparent, 
compliance to the demands of international community to stop the Serbian aggression 
has repeatedly been overlooked by the Bosnian Serbs. Such a disregard brought the 
principal coercing coalition of Western governments under the UN and NATO 
framework to specify and to limit their demands, while adding the credible threats for 
non-compliance. Only after the Bosnian Serbs were convinced that the Western 
involvement was a rigorous one, did they start to gradually comply with the clear, 
specific but limited demands of the coercing coalition. 
 The effectiveness of the clear demands during the course of the Bosnian War 
can be traced in two crucial instances of international involvement. Given the opening 
impact of the clear demands, these instances can be marked as the cornerstones of the 
international involvement to the conflict, marking its degree shift from wavering 
reluctance to decisive consensus for an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy.  
 The first instance was in August of 1993, while the capital of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sarajevo, was under the siege of the Bosnian Serbs for more than a year 
despite all Western diplomatic initiatives. As it becomes evidently clear that there is a 
strong need for clear demand coupled with a credible threat to overcome the Serbian 
intransigence, on 2 August 1993, NATO threatens to undertake immediate 
preparations for stronger measures, including air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if the 
strangulation of Sarajevo continued. (Jakobsen 1998, 91). The clarity of demand in its 
content and limitation in its scope, while effectively communicating the consensus for 
the action in case of non-compliance, brought the strangulation of Sarajevo to an end, 
though not yet the removal of the entire heavy-weapons of the Bosnian Serbs from 
around Sarajevo.   
 Since Western governments have not followed keenly the partial success of the 
first clear demand to generate the lasting solution to the conflict, this hesitation led to 
    
another year of continued Serbian aggression. After this aggression acquired its most 
vivid form in the world media with the killing of 68 people in a marketplace in Sarajevo 
on 5 February 1994, such cruelty triggered a strong NATO response. The Bosnian 
Serbs were given ten days to comply with NATO demands or face air strikes (NATO 
Press Release 1994, 15). To further constrain any possible Serbian manipulation of the 
implementation of the demands on the ground, NATO made its demands even clearer: 
On February 9, 1994, NATO demanded that the Bosnian Serbs remove heavy weapons 
from an exclusion zone or turn them over to UN control (Tanter and Psarouthakis 
1999, 66). The alliance coupled its demand with a threat of air strikes. As a result of the 
coordinated efforts of the UN and NATO during the February confrontation, the 
Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weapons or placed them under UN control. The 
unprecedented consensus within the alliance concerning the use of air power and its 
rigorous formulation in terms of the clear demand, coupled with the credible threat and 
a sense of urgency, brought an unprecedented, timely Serbian compliance.     The idea 
here, in the words of NATO Secretary-General Claes, was to demonstrate to the 
Bosnian Serbs the futility of further military actions(Silber 1995, 8). 
 Although, this idea remains in the Western rhetoric as an objective of the 
Western involvement from the beginning of the conflict, such standing has neither been 
formulated in the clear demand manner nor supported with potent military threat (i.e., 
air strikes). As a result, the effective issuance of the clear demand proved essential in 
introducing a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, having a clear 
demand is not sufficient alone; it needs to be combined with the remaining conditions 
for the success of coercive diplomacy.   
 
2) Use of Ultimatum 
 As the starkest variant of coercive diplomacy, the use of ultimatum plays a vital 
role in attaining Serbian compliance to the UN demands. After more than two years 
interplay of ineffective economic sanctions and diplomatic initiatives in the European 
front (as described in Chapter 3) the international community came to the point of 
realizing the essence of full-fledged ultimatum for the sake of halting the Serbian 
aggression. Although the Western governments maintained their clear demands in this 
period, the need for qualifying them with time pressure and substantiating them with 
credible threats remained essential in making use of the ultimatums in the Bosnian War. 
    
Such ultimatums were employed basically in three essential occasions during the 
conflict.    
  Firstly, NATO issued an ultimatum to substantiate its clear demand aiming at 
stopping the strangulation of Sarajevo. As it has been mentioned in the Clear Demand 
part, this was the reaction of international community to the killing of 68 people in a 
marketplace in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994.  
 
After hectic activity both in the Bosnian theatre and in the international arena, 
on 10 February 1994, following a request to the Atlantic Alliance from Boutros 
Ghali on 7 February, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs: they 
were given a ten-day deadline to withdraw their heavy weaponry from what 
would become a twenty-kilometer radius heavy weapons exclusion zone around 
Sarajevo, or to place it under UNPROFOR control  otherwise it would be 
destroyed by air strikes. (Freedman 1998, 288) 
 
This ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), threatening extensive action if it did 
not cease, had brought the Serb assaults to the capital to an end. Although, it was 
limited in its scope, the NATO ultimatum fulfills all requirements of full-fledged 
ultimatum in credible and potent manner, so as to pressure the adversary (i.e., BSA) to 
comply with the demands. As this conviction can be observed from the speech of 
Clintons National Security Advisor Lake, who expressed the conventional view held in 
the West in September of 1994: The Sarajevo ultimatum succeeded because the threat 
of NATO air power was judged real(Lake 1994, 24). 
 After the Serbian aggression had been seized by the effective but limited 
utilization of ultimatum, the BSA directed its attacks on the other UN declared safe 
areas in Bosnia that are even more vulnerable to Serbian assaults, and therefore more 
difficult to be protected by the international community. The example of such attacks 
came, when the BSA attacked on the safe-area of Gorazde in late April 1994. Given the 
success of the one in February, NATO did not hesitate to issue one more ultimatum of 
the same kind: 
On 22 April 1994, when NATO gave the BSA an ultimatum and threatened to 
carry out wide-scale air strikes. NATO demanded that the Bosnian Serbs stop 
their attack on Gorazde immediately, that they pull back three kilometers from 
the center of Gorazde by 00:01Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) on 24 April and 
that they withdraw all heavy weapons from a 20-kilometer exclusion zone 
around Gorazde by 00:01 GMT on 27 April. (NATO Press Release 1994, 31-
32) 
 
    
As a result of UN and NATO cooperation and the selected air strikes, there was 
effective compliance with the NATO ultimatum. Having realized its potential of 
coercing Serbs to comply with the UN demands and halting their attacks on safe-areas, 
the alliance also threatened to counter BSA attacks on any of the six UN-designated 
safe areas with wide-scale air strikes (NATO Press Release 1994, 31-32). However, 
given the absence of the remaining component of the full-fledged ultimatum (i.e., the 
sense of urgency), Serbs failed to fully comply with this demand until the end of the 
conflict in November 1995.    
 As noted above, Serbs were more submissive to the coercers demands when 
they were limited in scope and specific in terms of time for compliance and threat for 
non-compliance. As the demands of the ultimatums evolve from limited to extensive 
ones aiming to halt the Serbian aggression in the entire Bosnian territory the Serbian 
resistance hardens, and therefore necessitated the use of exemplary, limited force to 
persuade the opponent (i.e., Bosnian Serbs) to comply with the demand. This situation 
became fact when NATOs Secretary General Willy Claes issued a new ultimatum on 3 
September 1995: He gave General Mladic until 1:00 p.m. on 4 September to halt all 
attacks on Sarajevo and the other three safe areas, withdraw his heavy weapons 
Sarajevo and guarantee freedom of movement for the UN in Bosnia (Atkinson 1995). 
After, Mladic, the General of the BSA, failed to comply with the ultimatum NATO 
resumed its bombing campaign on 5 September. Although NATO demonstrated its 
resoluteness, the BSA resistance to comply with the ultimatum continued for a few 
more days until Tomahawk cruise missiles were used for the first time on 10 
September; 4 days later the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the conditions set out by the UN 
and NATO.  
 As the complexities of implementing the ultimatums illustrate, ultimatums prove 
to be effective as long as they convince the adversary that they will be resolutely carried 
out. Otherwise, the credibility of the coercer becomes at stake, and therefore its future 
demands tend to receive partial responses, at best. Nevertheless, the maintenance of 
such resoluteness in the post-Cold war era becomes increasingly challenging, and thus 
the conviction of the adversary turns out to be ever more contingent upon the effective 
combination of the remaining conditions for the success coercive diplomacy. 
 
 
 
    
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost 
 In the early phases of conflict, given that the risk of the threat can be called 
through an overt non-compliance to the coercers demands, Western governments were 
unable or unwilling to make threats that were either sufficiently credible or sufficiently 
potent to affect the Serbs, who appeared more highly motivated to reject any demands 
than Western governments were to enforce them.  Such reluctance towards active 
international involvement can be attributed to governments and military experts on the 
both sides of the Atlantic opposed military intervention since clear political objectives 
were lacking and because they feared that the Serbs would make the costs unacceptable 
by resorting to guerilla warfare (Jakobsen 1998, 85). This apparent Western 
indecisiveness for generating credible military threats due to the fact that unacceptable 
costs of escalation for the Western governments implicitly encouraged the Bosnian 
Serbs to ever more increase their policies of ethnic cleansing and irredentist 
expansionism.  In this early period, Serbs occupied nearly 70 per cent of the territory of 
Bosnia and continued to threaten the strategic points (e.g., Sarajevo, Gorazde) in the 
remaining 30. As Western unwillingness to make credible threats of force ensured that 
Serbian compliance would not be forthcoming (Jakobsen 1998, 86), thus such 
wavering can be counted as the principal reason for the ineffectiveness of international 
efforts in the early phases of the conflict. 
The second and decisive phase started only after the Western governments 
realize that the Serbs only paid serious attention to Western demands when they 
perceived military action as a real possibility (Jakobsen 1998, 86). In order to make the 
threat of military action a reasonable possibility, Western governments limited their 
demands and generated sufficiently credible and potent threats of force to put teeth in 
the demands. As this process begins to signal Western resolve, Serbs become more apt 
to adhere to these demands. During the course of the conflict, the limited demands that 
the Serbs adhered to included: opening the Sarajevo airport for delivery of humanitarian 
supplies, permitting air-drops of food and medicine, and establishing safe havens in 
various parts of Bosnia. As the attainment of these demands was a matter of rigorous 
coercive diplomacy on the ground and on the table, their maintenance during the course 
of the conflict was even a greater challenge for coercive diplomacy. The Bosnian Serbs 
knew that the West would be unwilling to suffer more than a minimum of casualties in 
Bosnia and regarded attacks on UN personnel as an effective way of making air strikes 
too costly for the West (Jakobsen 1998, 88). Not surprisingly, if not even anticipated 
    
by the Western governments, Serbs resorted to this move of counter-escalation in a 
more limited manner. They took some 400 UN personnel in late May 1995 as hostages 
and attacked the remaining two safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. Unlike, the 
anticipation of the Bosnian Serbs, the formers attempt of making military intervention 
more costly, although successful, could not prevent decisive action. In contrast, this led 
the Western powers to adopt a more aggressive policy. Britain, France, the Netherlands 
and Belgium began to deploy a 10 000-strong Rapid Reaction Force equipped with 
artillery in June, and NATO began threatening to use air power on an unprecedented 
scale in July. (Dodd 1995, 14)  Complementarily, the Americans offered a credible 
threat to the Serbs, NATO agreed to launch air strikes and the Croats proved capable of 
launching a lightening speed military operation against Serbs (Tanter and Psarouthakis 
1999, 49). Such combination of various elements of both international community and 
the conflicting parties made an active involvement less costly, and thus more attainable, 
for each of them. These developments on the ground undoubtedly contributed to the 
negotiations of the final settlement to the conflict. As Gow pointed such essence of the 
credible threats in the Bosnian War: there was ample evidence that whenever there had 
been enough of a threat to put doubt in the minds of the parties, especially the Bosnian 
Serbs, it had produced a positive outcome, facilitating the conduct of diplomacy 
(Freedman 1998, 287). 
 
4) Usable military options 
 As the Western resolve shifts from wavering responses to decisive policies 
towards active international involvement in the Bosnian War, the military options 
employed evolved from mild to severe. This advancement of military options basically 
takes place from traditional peacekeeping to more assertive use of military power in the 
forms of air strikes, Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on the side of the international 
community, and later, but extensive ground success of the anti-Serb warring parties 
(i.e., Bosnian Muslims and Croats).  
 At the beginning, the only available military option was the UN peacekeeping 
force (UNPROFOR) in the territories of former Yugoslavia, of which its mandate had 
been extended to cover Bosnia as well. UNPROFOR, the UN force on the territories of 
former Yugoslavia, was given its most assertive role in Bosnia. However, its role was 
constrained by the tensions within its mandate and by its scope to respond to Serbian 
taunts (Freedman 1998, 285). This problematic situation primarily stems from the high 
    
vulnerability of UNPROFOR to counter-coercive measures of the Bosnian Serbs, such 
as hostage taking. Ironically, the UN protection force - designated to protect the lives of 
the Bosnian civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid  was unable to protect itself. 
This brought NATO involvement into picture with the aim of providing air support to 
UNROFOR. According to Tanter and Psarouthakis, when economic sanctions alone 
did not compel the Serbs, peacekeeping provided an opening for the introduction of 
alliance airpower  (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 64). Their point was substantiated 
when the BSA attack began to overrun the UN-designated safe area Gorazde, NATO, 
acting in support of UNPROFOR, carried out the first hostile air-to-surface attacks in its 
history against individual tanks and command positions (Freedman 1998, 289). Such 
an enhanced availability of military options in terms of the threat credibility as well as 
ground feasibility resulted in ceasefire and agreement to withdraw three kilometers from 
the center of Gorazde. 
 Given the apparent effectiveness of NATO air power as a primary coercing 
instrument, and thus usable military option in Gorazde, it was decided to use the threat 
of air strikes to promote a peace settlement (Jakobsen 1998, 93). This brought the 
problem of UNPROFOR vulnerability in the case of Serbian counter-coercion in the 
form of taking its personnel as hostages. To prevent the BSA from counter-escalate, 
protect UNROPFOR personnel, and therefore preserve NATO air power as reliable 
military option, the UN existence in Bosnia needs to be reinforced in a comprehensive 
manner. James Gow illustrates this wide-ranging international commitment: 
  
As international engagement increased in Bosnia, with the UN force growing to 
over 24,000 there (backed by air power made available by NATO and 
supplemented by a comprehensive sanctions package against Serbia and 
Montenegro), recognition grew among those involved in the international 
engagement that a more forceful and coercive approach was appropriate, if 
international approaches were to succeed. (Freedman 1998, 291). 
  
In this process of increasingly active international engagement, the preservation of air 
power was of critical importance for the success on the ground, and therefore to convert 
it to a viable peace settlement on the table. On the ground, the high vulnerability to air 
strikes will maximize threat credibility because use of air power is a low-risk option in 
terms of casualties (Freedman 1998, 78). Thus, it is functional both in terms of its 
potency on the ground, and in terms of its relatively low military and political costs (i.e., 
very low-risk of NATO fighters being shot by Serbian air defense, and therefore low 
    
casualties). On the table, prior peace plans were not as successful as Dayton because 
NATO had not used force as a prelude to diplomacy (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 
52). The facts support their claim in manner that any of the pre-Dayton proposals, 
Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg, and the Contact Group Plan, did not benefit from 
decisive NATO air strikes. 
 In the final phase of the international involvement, NATOs decisive air strikes 
became known as Operation Deliberate Force, coupled with Rapid Reaction Force 
artillery and NATO jets began to pound BSA positions on 30 August 1995(Atkinson 
1995). NATOs Secretary General Claes pointed to the effectiveness of Operation 
Deliberate Force as a textbook demonstration of the use of limited force in the service 
of diplomacy (NATO Public Information Office 1995). Nevertheless, the deployment 
of the Rapid Reaction Force and the relocation of UN personnel into more defensible 
positions paved the way for the use of large-scale air strikes by reducing the risk of 
BSA retaliation to a tolerable level. Even though the apparent military preparedness of 
the Western governments to execute their threats in case of Serbian non-compliance, the 
Bosnian Serbs complied with UN demands only after the NATO air strikes had been 
carried out for a while. As Tanter and Psarouthakis noted, Prior to the systematic use 
of military force, the Serbs could not kept in check. NATO airpower and Croatian 
military success on the ground were two factors that made for a preponderance of 
credible power(Pape 1996). 
 
5) Strong Leadership 
Since any consensus on policies involving the threat and use of force requires 
leadership by one or more actors involved, and Bosnia is no different in terms of the 
essence of political consensus behind moves on the ground, the contemplation of 
international leadership during the Bosnian War can be traced under the two main 
phases of the conflict. In the early phases of the Bosnian war leadership did not extend 
beyond diplomatic and economic initiatives (Jakobsen 1998, 86). In this phase, the 
European Community (EC), embarked on diplomacy without force, thus depicting its 
inability to agree and hammer out any policy towards decisive international 
involvement. The futility of such approach lacking any political and military leadership 
revealed itself from the very early stages of the war, when the BSA blocked the 
international airport of Sarajevo in June 1992. After this apparent Serbian obstruction of 
    
international humanitarian aid, the EC become conscious of its ineffectiveness against 
strongly motivated aggressors. To address the crisis,      
  
The EC stepped up the pressure on 27 June 1992, declaring that it did not 
exclude support for use of military means and urging the Security Council to 
take all necessary measures for reopening the airport. These threats of force 
effectively made the coercive diplomacy strategy conducted by the UN and 
Western powers two-pronged. One prong was the economic sanctions. They 
were primarily aimed at Belgrade in order to coerce it to stop its support to the 
BSA and put pressure on the BSA leadership to comply with UN demands. The 
other prong was the military threat aimed directly at the Bosnian Serb forces. 
(FBIS-WEU 1992, 9) 
 
Still this two-pronged approach remained ineffective in the subsequent years of the war, 
until the action of those on the ground backed by timely and coherent political 
commitment (Freedman 1998, 287). The apparent ineffectiveness of the European 
involvement in the early phases of the war highlights the importance of leadership in 
crafting a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. As Jakobsen points out this 
deficiency in the international involvement to the Bosnian War, the absence of any 
leadership explains why the Western powers only used force on symbolic scale until the 
summer of 1995 (Freedman 1998, 77). Thus, given the interrelatedness of the success 
conditions, such lack of leadership prevented the employment of the preceding 
conditions such as clear demand etc. to commence an effective strategy, and persuade 
the adversary (i.e., the BSA) to better comply with the agreed policy rather than resist to 
it.    
Leadership involves a readiness to press on firmly to attain support for a specific 
policy and admit most of the costs coupled with it. The emergence of an active US 
involvement to the conflict after the marketplace massacre in Sarajevo in April 1994 
constitutes an example akin to such understanding of leadership, although it has certain 
drawbacks emanating particularly from the later involvement to prolonged warfare on 
the ground.  Washington became actively involved in the Bosnian crisis when the 
inter-European power play endangered the overall relations between the United States 
and Europe and when it became pointedly obvious that the European approach to 
ending the war in Bosnia was futile (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 47). In order to 
avoid the recurrence of any failure of international involvement, which undoubtedly can 
bring NATO credibility at stake, the Clinton administration recognized the essence of 
synchronizing threats of force with clear diplomatic objectives that were generated by 
    
political consensus within the Alliance and therefore can be carried out immediately in 
case of possible Serbian non-compliance. As the Western coalition improved its 
leadership, and pressed for comprehensive peace settlement, the intransigence of the 
Bosnian Serbs became apparent on the table as well. The Bosnian Serb Republica 
Srpska Assembly rejected this [the Contact Group plan] plan on August 3, 1994 
(Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 47). Despite the failure of the Contact group to coerce 
the Bosnian Serbs, the Serbian rejection served the ends of Americans in terms 
strengthening their hand for ever-more active ground engagement and thus stronger 
leadership role within the Alliance. It was not until Washington spearheaded NATO 
military operations with diplomatic activity that the parties signed the Dayton Peace 
Agreement of December 1995 (Tanter and Psarouthakis 1999, 51). 
 
6) Domestic Support 
 As it can be traced from the contemplation of the remaining conditions for 
success, the effective international involvement to the Bosnian War and thus the 
orchestrated implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy tends to follow the 
pattern from early hesitancy towards active engagement to later decisiveness for lasting 
settlement. The underlying motive of such pattern was the widespread coverage of the 
Serbian atrocities by Western media, and therefore rising public pressure in the Western 
public towards to do something to seize the Serb aggression, and assure lasting order 
through settlement. Otherwise, Bosnia was not a priority for London or Paris (Tanter 
and Psarouthakis 1999, 65). Coupled with the common European reluctance to use 
force, the domestic pressure paved the way for the early ineffective diplomatic 
maneuvers of the EC to soothe the mounting public pressure for Western involvement. 
The situation was no better on the American side where the threat to its national security 
was far from being immediate, if not irrelevant. For that reason,  the administration 
regarded Bosnia as a quagmire and based its policy on the assumption that the 
American public would never support the deployment of US ground troops (Jakobsen 
1998, 89). Thus, in the early phases of the conflict, the Western powers almost 
unanimously agreed to refrain from any potential military engagement and thus sound 
threats and effective coercive diplomacy. However, this consensus over inaction 
becomes increasingly unexplainable to rising concerns by the Western public.  
 
    
The Western powers entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1992 
determined to keep their military involvement to a minimum in order to avoid a 
potential quagmire. This proved impossible due to periodic, but very strong, 
outbursts of public outrage, which forced the Western governments to escalate 
their involvement in a series of small steps. (Jakobsen 1998, 79) 
 
The initial step was the deployment of UN peacekeepers as a reaction to public 
pressure on European governments to do something to stop the Serbian attacks on the 
Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilians. As an active mean to halt the Serbian aggression, 
selective air strikes on Serbian positions were regarded as an acceptable involvement in 
most of the public opinion polls throughout Europe. The example of such an impressive 
majority was an opinion poll [which] showed that 70 per cent believed French forces 
should participate in air strikes on Serbian positions (Buchan 1994). Although, air 
strikes were originally an American idea for active involvement that was repeatedly 
countered by the Europeans, their public opinion tended to support this measure as 
effective mean to stop the Serbian attacks. Indeed, NATO threats of air strikes, usually 
resulted from US pressure, were undertaken to settle down a strong domestic pressure 
for military action in the American public. The day after the massacre, ABC News cited 
a poll showing that almost 60 per cent of the American public supported air strikes, 
and congressional support was strong too (Jakobsen 1998, 96). Coupled with strong 
domestic support, if not an upsurge with congressional support, it became an obligatory 
task for the Clinton administration to convince a reluctant Pentagon bureaucracy to 
frame the Bosnian situation in terms of potential loss of NATO credibility in light of 
noncompliance by Belgrade. Therefore, ever increasing domestic pressure for decisive 
international engagement generated the ground for international support, and 
coordination of efforts at political and military levels for the eruption of the sound 
strategy of coercive diplomacy. As pointed out by Jakobsen, Increased domestic 
pressure on the governments to do something to break the deadlock in Bosnia provides 
part of the explanation why policy was changed [in the Western capitals] (Jakobsen 
1998, 103). 
 
 
 
 
 
    
7) International Support 
  Following the pattern from early wavering to later coherent decisiveness, the 
initial phases of the war illustrated the divergence between the EU and the US on the 
means of the force to be employed.  For the most part, the political differences in the 
West on the use of air strikes and the political sensitivity to the issue of hostages came 
particularly after the use of close air support and a NATO ultimatum backed by the 
threat of air strikes in April 1994 (Freedman 1998, 292). Although the ultimatum itself 
was successful in halting the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, disagreements on how to 
use force within UNPROFOR and among Western governments had been made 
apparent. Such discrepancy particularly stemmed from the European concern (esp. 
British and French) for their troops in Bosnia, while the Americans adamantly resisted 
on attaining support for the utilization of air power, given the fact that they have no 
troops on the ground. For that reason, European governments opposed air strikes out of 
fear that it would endanger the lives of their troops on the ground (Jakobsen 1998, 88). 
Consequently, this divergence on the both sides of the Atlantic undermined the effective 
employment of the strategy of coercive diplomacy. On the operational front, the 
apparent disagreement on the means of use of force prevented the UN and NATO to 
issue proper ultimatums backed by credible threats. Thus, even the all measures 
necessary resolution (770) contained no deadline for compliance and the threat 
credibility quickly evaporated due to disagreement between the US and its main 
European allies concerning how they should employ force (Jakobsen 1998, 83). On the 
negotiation front, the influence of international organizations was too limited to enable 
the Western powers to reach a consensus on the use of force in an immediate while. 
Particularly, the inadequacy of consensus building mechanisms between the both sides 
of the Atlantic became ever more apparent. Undoubtedly, the international failure to 
calibrate its position with that of the Bosnian Serbs led to a number of unresolved 
cadences which allowed the war to continue and the Bosnian Serb leadership to defy 
international opinion (Freedman 1998, 295). 
 As the war prolonged, the ineffectiveness of half-hearted measures revealed and 
became clearer to the public in the West. Thus, the domestic pressure on the both sides 
of the Atlantic obliged their leaders to attain an international consensus on the effective 
means to use of force. Two months prior to the beginning of Operation Deliberate 
Force, the Western powers reached a consensus on military and political strategy 
allowing them to back diplomacy with force for the first time since war in Bosnia had 
    
started (Jakobsen 1998, 104). Ultimately achieving this consensus was essential for the 
restoration of the alliance credibility (i.e., NATO).  To this end, the foreign ministers of 
France, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Germany formed the Contact Group, 
crafted the peace plan dividing Bosnia into two sections  - 51 percent for the Bosnian 
Federation (composed of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and 49 per cent for the 
Bosnian Serbs, and finally agreed on the means to hammer out the already rejected (by 
the Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska Assembly on August 3, 1994) peace plan. As James 
Gow illustrated the eventual Western coordination, harmonized international resolve, 
in the end, produced a resolved coercive cadence (Freedman 1998, 296). 
 
8) Assurance against future demands  
Facing an adversary like the Bosnian Serbs that were even intransigent in 
complying with the issued ultimatums and rejecting the declared demands such as the 
Contact Group peace plan (rejected by the Bosnian Serb Republica Srpska Assembly on 
August 3, 1994), the strategy of coercive diplomacy could barely attain its 
predetermined outcomes, let alone bringing into the picture new ones. The international 
community was in a more desperate need for assurance for the Serbian compliance to 
the UN demands rather than the Serbs need to be assured against future demands of 
international community. Although this was an ever- more apparent case, the 
assurances that compliance would not lead to more demands were provided by the 
efforts undertaken by UN personnel to avoid the strikes and more generally by the 
manifest Western reluctance to use force (Jakobsen 1998, 98). 
 
9) Use of carrot 
The US negotiators preferred to use carrots to persuade Milosevic to seize his 
support to the Bosnian Serbs and thus to induce them to sign the Contact Group peace 
plan. The principal carrot of the US negotiators was the lifting of Sanctions over 
Serbia proper, since this was the factor that Milosevic valued, and its attainment was 
solely contingent upon the removal of the Western naval and aerial blockade of the 
former Yugoslavia. Milosevics cooperation with the West stemmed from his strong 
interest in getting UN sanctions lifted, and they consequently played a positive role in 
the success as well (Jakobsen 1998, 102). On the other hand, the US negotiators tried 
to introduce both sides with carrots in order to facilitate their agreement on the 
    
Contact Group plan through the accommodation of the interests on the both sides of the 
table. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement addressed the goal of the Bosnian Muslims for a 
unified state and a functional central government within internationally 
recognized borders. The agreement addressed the Bosnian Serb goal of having 
an independent entity with the right to self-determination. Dayton also gave the 
Serbs a viable corridor, and thus a unified territory. (Tanter and Psarouthakis 
1999, 53)  
 
At the end, the use of carrots as well proved essential for the success of the gradual 
peace settlement. 
  
Analyzing the Conditions for Success in Coercive Diplomacy in the IInd Gulf War 
 
1) Clear Demand  
 As it can be traced in the assessment of the remaining conditions as well, 
international involvement and the contemplation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy 
during the Second Gulf War were significantly different (than those of the Bosnian 
war), complex, and controversial. Such complexity began to emerge as the US strategy 
of counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and influencing regime change in the Middle 
East acquired particular momentum in the aftermath of the 9/11.  These notions have 
remained prominent in the American political and military discourse in the post-9/11 
history of international interventions. 
  Apparently, the above-mentioned American concerns contributed to the 
demands on the target adversary (i.e., Saddam Hussein and his regime). In order to 
make these demands address the American concerns in a comprehensive manner, the 
Bush administration build its demands on Iraq in two-fold manner.  The underlying 
notion of the administration to put up its demands in the manner that can be attributed to 
its assumption, which can be summarized as the most effective form of 
nonproliferation  [is] an effort to bring about the demise of the regimes themselves 
(Kagan and Kristol 2000). Thus, the Bush administration based its demands on two 
distinct, but inter-related objectives of the US policy towards rogue states (e.g., Iraq, N. 
Korea, Iran). In that regard the ultimate aim of the US policy was not merely to disarm 
and topple down Saddam but rather to demonstrate the world that similar tendencies 
(akin to Saddam) will not be left without rigorous American counter-measures, 
including the use of force. Such a premise of major demands also highlights the 
    
prospects and the limits of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq, and therefore defines a 
policy range of which, at optimum, for the primary policy-makers, it was regime 
change without war (i.e. via coup), and at minimum deterring the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by minor powers (North Korea, Iran as well as Iraq) (Bell 2003, 225). Given 
the essence of formulating clear demands at the very beginning of the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy, the aspiration of the Bush administration to realize the above-
mentioned objectives simultaneously and immediately led the administration pursue a 
kind of all in one approach. This approach was the one that led to the confusion in 
international community with regards to support American intervention, and not 
surprisingly encouraged deception by the adversary. On the one hand, President Bush 
stressed the American demand in a clear-cut manner on 12 Sept. 2002: If the Iraq 
regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally foreswear, disclose and 
remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and all related 
material (Bell 2003, 225). On the other hand, in his speech on 26 Feb. 2003 the 
President gave a clear, firm, public indication that he had decided that nothing less 
than regime change would do (Bell 2003, 227). Thus, although within the framework 
of the greater American strategy these objectives are complementary, in the formulation 
of a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq, they tend to produce 
contradictory outcomes towards American ends. To be more specific, shifting the 
demands from comprehensive disarmament of Saddam to his consensual or forceful 
removal, promises only a little (if any) cooperation from either Saddam or the 
international community. Therefore, from the very beginning the formulation of the 
American demands tended to produce controversial international outcomes and needless 
to say lack of Iraqi full-compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions on its 
disarmament.      
 Nevertheless, as events continue to unfold, the Bush strategy is becoming 
clearer and it appears to be based on what political scientists call coercive diplomacy 
(Reed 2002, 1). As Schelling underlines the path of coercive diplomacy: It is the threat 
of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make somebody yield or comply 
(Reed 2002, 1). In the case of Iraq, Bush wants Saddam to comply unconditionally and 
immediately with the UN resolutions. Given the months lacking full-compliance (12 
Sept. 2002-26 Feb.2003), the formulation of Bush strategy evolved from disarmament 
to regime change with the aim of assuring full-compliance. Thus, although the 
perceived controversy towards these demands by the adversary and international 
    
community is underlined, these demands are by all means essential, founding elements 
of the strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq. This motive has also been 
underlined in terms of the realization of these demands the coercive diplomacy that 
could yet lead to Saddam's disarmament or his disposal by his own side must be 
pursued (The Guardian, 2003).  To this end, the Bush administration has clear 
demands not only from the adversary but also from the international community in a 
manner to maintain support for the full-compliance by Iraq to the UN resolutions. Even 
the administration steps forward by demanding another UN resolution to authorize the 
use of force, in case of prolonged incomplete Iraqi compliance. As Jim Reed stresses 
this tendency of the Bush administration, The Bush strategy strongly implies the need 
for a second Security Council resolution that would require Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei 
to define explicitly all Iraqi acts of non-compliance. Iraq would then have to choose 
whether or not to co-operate fully (Reed 2002, 3).  The underlying motive of this 
demand from the international community was to equip the principal coercer (i.e., the 
US) with adequate means to exercise its projected threat in case of non-compliance. The 
essential mean in that regard was international legitimacy for decisive American action 
(i.e., American occupation of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power).         
 The Bush Doctrine rightly focuses on the principle of regime change as the 
most effective means of defeating threats posed by rogue and terrorist-hosting 
weak states, but actual regime change can entail considerable, even 
unacceptable, military and political risk, depending upon local, regional, and 
international circumstances. (Hamill 2003, 14) 
 
Undoubtedly, these circumstances have impact on the success of the coercive 
diplomacy. This impact will become ever more apparent as coercive diplomacy unfolds, 
and the remaining repercussions continue to be analyzed under the following conditions 
for success. 
  
2) Use of Ultimatum 
Given the range of clear demands (though they are interrelated) with regards to 
Iraq varies from assuring full compliance of Saddam to UN resolutions to remove him 
from power to ensure his proper disarmament, it is of no doubt that the use of 
ultimatums can involve certain complexities. According to Langenheim,  there are a 
variety of dangers in making an ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq 
(Langenheim 2002, 6). For instance, a poorly timed ultimatum can cause significant 
    
political backlash, provoke preemptive military action, or an adversary may respond 
with conditional or partial acceptance, prompting calls for negotiations or third-party 
mediation (George 1991, 73). The US fell in these traps in a combined manner. 
Initially, the Bush administration repeatedly threatened Saddam with unilateral military 
action to topple down his regime, if he failed to fully comply with the UN resolutions, 
but the US refrained to issue a time limit till the very end, 24 hours before the beginning 
of the US-led war against Iraq. Secondly, this ambiguity due to a lack of time pressure 
coupled with the incomplete compliance of Saddam to UN resolutions. Thus, neither the 
time limit nor the conditions to trigger military action were clearly set forth. From the 
first chapter, we know that a state may choose to make the ultimatum tacit, by 
omitting either the time limit or the threat of punishment (but not both). Although the 
threat of punishment (i.e., regime change through military action) was made abundantly 
clear by the Bush administration, the conditions for its trigger are lacking clarity, 
particularly for the situation like in Iraq where Saddam had a history of more than a 
decade of limited compliance.  For all these reasons, ultimatums are not to be issued 
lightly, but some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply coercive 
diplomacy against Iraq (Langenheim 2002, 6). Until the very the day before the war, 
the full-fledged ultimatum remained the inadequacy of American strategy. However, as 
outlined above, this does not mean that the Bush administration has not take steps in 
terms of ultimatum, and advocate their approval by international community. To this 
end, Robert Keohane put forward that Resolution 1441 afforded Iraq a final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations (Keohane 2002, 1). Given the 
uncertainties with regards to domestic and international reactions, and ever-apparent 
determination of the Bush administration, this declaration can be interpreted as an 
ultimatum of its multilateral coercive diplomacy, although lacking the elements of full-
fledged ultimatum. The remaining conditions that tend to complicate rather than ease 
the declaration of the ultimatums will be analyzed in the following conditions for the 
success of coercive diplomacy.  
 
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost 
Given the habit of Saddams deficient attitude towards the implementation of the 
UN Security Council Resolutions regarding his disarmament, the essence of credible 
threat remains critical to enforce the resolutions. Particularly, if the assertive policy of 
the Bush administration is considered as the apparent part of the iceberg of the 
    
prolonged US Gulf involvement since 1990 First Gulf War, it is evident that the threat 
level needs to be increased, if the outcome is to be successful at this time. The ultimate 
penalty for Saddam Hussein this time [2nd Gulf War] is not just a military attack against 
his country [like in the 1st Gulf War], but rather the loss of what he treasures above all 
else: his position as head of state (Reed 2002, 2). Thus, this time the level of threat was 
dramatically increased and made obvious for Saddam to realize that this time the US is 
serious in carrying out such a threat. The Guardian points out this essential ingredient of 
coercive diplomacy in the Gulf, Indeed, the military build-up remains the best strategy 
for seeking to disarm him, short of war (The Guardian, 2003). Therefore, the threat 
was substantiated by the concrete military build-up in the Gulf to enable the US to 
launch an ample air and ground campaign not only for limited use of force, but also to 
be able to occupy the entire country to topple down Saddams regime. On the one hand, 
this was a clear signal on the operational front for Saddam. On the other, coupled with 
the American claim for unilateral action, this was even more important signal for the 
international community in general, and the UN Security Council members in 
particular, that the US-led coercive diplomacy has to be supported internationally to 
make the threats potent enough. In the early phases of the crisis, in late 2002, this 
approach was successful at least in building international support. Keohane put forward 
the value of such credible threat for triggering international mechanisms to work,   
Without a credible threat of unilateral American action, it is hard to imagine the 
Security Council talking such tough measures against Iraq (Keohane 2002, 1). The 
Result was the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, demanding tougher measures for 
the disarmament of Iraq and its monitoring, though not yet the authorization for all 
necessary measures (i.e., the use of force).  
 Although there is no question on the utility of credible threats in coercive 
diplomacy, as long as the coercer can enforce and legitimize them domestically and 
internationally, the condition for successful coercive diplomacy to threaten to defeat 
the adversary with little cost is not necessarily present in the Second Gulf War, as in 
the first one. According to Coral Bell,  The costs of invasion and occupation were 
estimated at about 132 billion US Dollars, and Germany and Japan were not willing or 
able to help fund those costs as they had been in 1991 (Bell 2003, 229). Thus, issuing a 
formidable threat does neither mean that it will generate greater support from 
international community nor greater compliance from the adversary. On the contrary, as 
it was the case in the Second Gulf War, it may trigger international reluctance (if not 
    
reaction) and therefore implicitly encourage the adversary to prolong its non-
compliance.  
Since Saddam was never likely to yield to anything but convincing threat or 
actual war (Bell 2003, 226) it was vital to maintain threat credibility. To this end, the 
US is for sure on the advantageous side, because of in terms of its preponderance in 
military realm provides effective means to execute its threats. Nevertheless, such upper 
hand does not mean that the US can be immune from the risks and costs of unilateral 
military intervention. As Langan points out to potential drawbacks, If the Iraq project 
graduates from coercive diplomacy to war, as it gives every indication of doing so, it is 
likely to achieve the objectives of disarmament and Saddams removal without great 
difficulty, but not without some significant negative results (Langan 2003, 1).  
 
4) Usable military options 
 As underlined in the previous condition, for coercive diplomacy to work it must 
be backed by credible threats of war. Hence in its attempts at coercive diplomacy, the 
US has committed itself to war, if Iraq refuses to comply with resolution 1441 
(Keohane 2002, 2).  Such commitment involves certain advantages and drawbacks 
towards the success of the strategy of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq.  
 On one hand, the US demonstrates its preponderance in terms of military 
preparedness and thus continues to emphasize unilateral and military and coercive 
measures (Zarif 2003, 75). Among the assertions of the Bush administration to this 
end, the most striking one comes from the US Vice-President Dick Cheney: If we have 
reason to believe someone is preparing an attack against the U.S., has developed that 
capability, harbors those aspirations, then I think the U.S. is justified in dealing with 
that, if necessary, by military force. In late 2002, he declared that the US would need 
no further justification to employ its military options, other than its perceived threat 
emanating from Iraqi regime. The assertiveness of the Bush administration was not 
merely restricted by stressing the potency of military options. Indeed, the diplomatic 
events were accompanied by a continuing military buildup in the Gulf region in obvious 
preparation for a military strike against Saddam Husseins regime, thus, coupling 
declaratory signals with operational signals on the ground. Operational signals are 
moves like deployment of armed forces, raising states of missile alert, readying of 
bases, overt stockpiling of weapons (Bell 2003, 224). The simultaneous introduction of 
declaratory and operational signals is of particular essence in making coercive 
    
diplomacy persuasive on the table through asserting the usable military options, as well 
as in assuring preparedness if the adversary fails to comply. As Reed underlines this 
critical aspect of the theory, Coercive diplomacy presumes that the power to defeat the 
enemy by brute force does, indeed, exists and will be used as the ultimate punishment 
for non-compliance 
(Reed 2002, 1).  For that reason, during the entire course of the Second Gulf Crisis the 
Bush administration has vigorously threatened military action, unilaterally if necessary, 
in hopes of motivating the elements within Saddams regime to revolt and bring an end 
to Iraqs isolation and suffering. Given that short of a coup by the Iraqi generals, 
regime change could be accomplished only by war (Bell 2003, 229), the administration 
had aimed to trigger internal dissent against Saddam and therefore enhance its military 
options beyond the apparent unilateral American military intervention. Nevertheless, 
such ongoing enhancement attempts promised little prospect, as Saddam remained the 
sole ruler of the country with no conceivable alternative that its dissidents could agree 
to follow. As the Pentagon came to realize this ever apparent fact about the regime in 
Iraq, it embarks on advocating a punishing air campaign followed by a vigorous 
ground offensive designed to overthrow swiftly the Bathist regime while 
simultaneously denying Saddam the opportunity to put into play a doomsday 
scenario (Baram 2001).  
Undoubtedly, to attain this strategy would be a daunting task, not so in terms of 
the potency of military options, but particularly in terms of gathering international and 
domestic support to legitimize their effective usage. This is the other hand, the hand of 
drawbacks of military options even though they are abundantly available for the US. 
These concerns over the drawbacks of the unilateral military operation against Iraq are 
underlined by Langenheim in late 2002: given the extent to which the worldwide 
struggle against al-Qaida depends upon the cooperation of allied governments, now is 
not the time to undertake a campaign in Iraq, if doing so would likely jeopardize 
relations with key allies and strategic partners (Langenheim 2002, 4). For that reason, 
once again, the consensual characteristics of coercive diplomacy come into the picture 
in terms of the critical essence of building domestic and international support through 
exercising strong leadership, if the strategy of coercive diplomacy is going to be 
successful in attaining not only particular goals (i.e., overthrow Saddam) but also, 
indeed more crucial, to realize long-term macro security objectives (i.e., counter-
terrorism, non-proliferation). 
    
5) Strong Leadership 
Strong leadership is of particular significance in situations akin to Iraq where 
there is lack of international consensus over the course of action, and domestic support 
is contingent upon carrying out a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy, through 
international legitimacy and adversary compliance. Although this is the ideal picture for 
the overall strategy (not only domestic dimension), the exercise of strong leadership and 
therefore an effective coercive diplomacy is complicated by the indecisiveness of the 
very similar factors as well. According to Reed, the implementation of coercive 
diplomacy has been complicated by three factors, each mostly beyond the control of the 
Bush administration: domestic opinion, international opinion, and the unpredictable 
behavior of Saddam Hussein (Reed 2002, 6).  
Given the need to address these factors in a manner that at least not to hamper 
the implementation of the strategy, if not to support it, opting for the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy alone is a prospective starting point. The underlying reason of such 
assumption is that it foresees both ways, and therefore can be regarded as a feasible 
strategy not only if successful, but also, indeed essential, even if it fails to coerce. In his 
article, Give Peace a Chance, First Try Coercive Diplomacy, Langenheim underlines 
such utility of the strategy:  
Coercive diplomacy against Iraq in late 2002 represents an opportunity to 
change the rules of the game. There are reasons to hope that the approach would 
succeed; yet even if it is doomed to failure, by making the attempt the United 
States would demonstrate that the Iraqi regimes belligerent and intransigent 
attitude, not American warmongering, is the root of the conflict. (Langenheim 
2002, 1) 
 
For that reason, the Bush administration, even though assertively unilateral, by 
introducing   coercive diplomacy as the principal way of involvement, stepped forward 
towards decisive leadership. In his analysis of the First Gulf War, Alexander George has 
also come up with similar supporting argument that ironically, the failure of coercive 
diplomacy was necessary to gain support for war when war became the last resort 
(George 1993, 88).  
 Although the strategy of coercive diplomacy pertains to the above-mentioned 
strengths in facilitating decisive leadership, it would not be a realistic contemplation to 
consider the strategy immune from shortcomings of its executors. In this regard, the 
Bush administrations overemphasis on unilateralism tends to be counterproductive in 
gathering international support for any US-led military intervention. Such drawback 
    
particularly stems from an increasingly predominant voice within the US 
administration to go it alone, thereby confusing unilateralism with leadership (Zarif 
2003, 72). Undoubtedly, such deliberate confusion has contributed to the widening rift 
between the US and the rest of the world, particularly Europe. Although, its unilateral 
leadership attempt produces reaction rather than support in international realm, the 
hardening rhetoric of the Bush Administration, coupled with continued US troop build 
up in the Gulf, produced some prospective outcomes towards reluctant compliance by 
Saddam. According to Reed, as a result of this hardening stance, Saddam  agreed to U-
2 surveillance flights, issued a presidential decree banning the importing and 
manufacturing of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (Reed 2002, 5). Not 
surprisingly, and indeed not unreasonably, this partial success of the strategy of 
coercing compliance were regarded as another wavering Saddam make-up to divert, the 
already at stake, international support for the actions of the Bush administration. 
Nevertheless, whatever Saddam considers about the role of international community, 
the strong leadership requires to maintain its commitments and since the disagreement 
within the Security Council is one of degree only, the time remaining for diplomatic 
efforts is finite (Reed 2002, 7). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Bush 
administration exercised strong leadership in handling the conflict. The apparent 
disagreement in the UN Security Council for the second resolution was the clear-cut 
demonstration of the diplomatic failure. Instead, the US [should] adopts a less 
aggressively unilateral approach, trying to persuade or compromise with its allies rather 
than simply issuing pre-emptory commands (Moravscsik 2003, 4). Although such 
consensual American attitude may not guarantee unanimous support for the UN 
resolution authorizing the use of force in case of continuing Iraqi non-compliance, such 
an action promises the softening of international opposition to the US-led military 
intervention. Therefore, following such path would be the one in accordance with the 
original aim and advantage of utilizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy for upcoming 
success or possible failure.  
 
6) Domestic Support  
 Facilitated by improved communication technologies and consequently greater 
circulation of information, the world public opinion appreciates the interdependence of 
domestic and international policies. Such interdependence greatly constraints national 
governments (Zarif 2003, 74). Given the essence of domestic support in maintaining 
    
the successful strategy of coercive diplomacy, having a domestic public opinion 
increasingly contingent upon the developments in international arena complicate the 
implementation and domestic justification of the American coercive diplomacy towards 
Iraq.    
 Although in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the American public opinion was 
strongly behind the Bush administration, this support gradually declined, due to the 
administrations unilateral rhetoric that could attract neither domestic nor international 
support. Influenced from the anti-war protests all over the world, the war-resistance 
protests had been generated even in the US (Bell 2003, 224). These protests, which 
could be regarded as the voices in the margins by many, were further confirmed by the 
opinion polls in the US. In late 2002, polls show that 56 per cent of the US public 
support an American-led war that has UN approval (Reed 2002, 7). Even if the 
influence of the international discontent from the American unilateral interventionist 
attitude was considered, the mere 56 per cent support for UN authorized American-led 
war was a clear indication of the domestic dissent from the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration. Even this degree of public support is conditioned upon the UN 
authorization. Thus, as it is illustrated in Figure 4-1, the American public tends to 
provide its support for international involvements contingent upon multilateralism. 
Having these figures on the eve of the second American Iraq involvement signals that 
the strategy of coercive diplomacy unilaterally initiated by the Bush administration 
attained declining degrees of public support from the very beginning. Jim Reed points 
out such difficulty that undoubtedly hampers the implementation of successful coercive 
diplomacy as well, the Bush administration has been at pains to try to persuade the US 
public to support the use of force and in the process has hurt its case (Reed 2002, 7). 
Further counter-moves in international realm, particularly from the European allies (i.e., 
NATO) against the US-led war, exacerbated the decline of the domestic public support 
for the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration. The influence of international 
support (or its absence) is elaborated in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: US citizens opinion about the US involvement in international crises 
(Worldviews Report 2002) 
 
7) International Support 
The impact of international support is not only critical in terms of influencing 
domestic public opinion, but also and, indeed, more essential for the success of the 
overall strategy of coercive diplomacy. This was particularly the case for the Second 
Gulf War in Iraq where the splits within various international organizations (i.e., UN, 
NATO, EU) became ever more apparent. Such divergence, between the both sides of 
the Atlantic primarily, without doubt contributed in a counter-productive manner during 
the course of multilateral attempts to make coercive diplomacy achieve its goals in 
success, short of war.  Given the fact that several instances since the end of the Cold 
War have clearly shown that for the US to deal effectively with any major international 
issue, it needs the cooperation of at least some of the major regional and global powers 
(Zarif 2003, 73), such a reality becomes ever more indispensable in the aftermath of 
9/11 when the primary issues under American concern (i.e., WMD, terrorism) have 
required substantial international cooperation. For that reason, the international 
support for the Second Gulf War was the key condition of success for coercive 
diplomacy, and the one of which its absence has proved to be the most detrimental for 
the coercer. Given such an essence of international support in the contemplation of 
coercive diplomacy in Iraq, this part extensively elaborates on the complexity of how 
    
the lack of international support can complicate coercive diplomacy and therefore leads 
to its failure. 
As the Bush administration repeatedly revealed its intention of intervening in 
Iraq after 9/11, virtually all NATO allies and every one of Americas regional strategic 
partners have disagreed with the use of military force either to compel Iraqi compliance 
with Security Council resolutions or to topple Saddams regime (Lederer 2002). Such 
apparent reluctance particularly among the international actors (i.e., the NATO allies) 
that the US expects tacit support at least, undoubtedly emboldened divisions in the 
wider international community (i.e., the UN Security Council), and therefore indirectly 
encouraged Saddams intransigence. Despite this starting with an early non-cooperative 
outlook from the international community, the Bush administration demonstrated its 
appeal to the UN, with the aim of assuring full compliance to its preceding resolutions 
concerning Iraqi disarmament. Indeed, a year after the 9/11, when the US President 
George W. Bush told the UN last September [Sept.2002] that Iraq must comply with all 
UN resolutions ordering it to disarm. It was a signal that the US had opted for a 
multilateral approach to its strategy of coercive diplomacy with respect to Iraq (Reed 
2002, 6). He addressed the UN and urged the nations of the world to support his call for 
Iraq to disarm peacefully or face serious consequences. As an opening phase of US 
policy, these maneuvers of the Bush administration were perfectly in line with 
multilateral coercive diplomacy. The administration combined the notions of embedded 
military threat (i.e., face serious consequences) with a public appeal to the UN 
members to back their decisions in the form of the Security Council resolutions. In the 
following month this multilateral approach bore fruits, and Bush was rewarded with a 
unanimous Security Council resolution (#1441); it called for rigorous program if 
weapons inspections in Iraq (Reed 2002, 2). Nevertheless, this early success story was 
to be no indication for the flourishing future of the US engagement in the Gulf. 
    
 
Figure 4-2: Cartoon illustrating the divergence in international community over Iraq in 
the Second Gulf War. (The Daily Telegraph 2003). 
 
Following the achievement in the international ground to get ever more strict 
weapons inspections, the US proceeded to keep up the pressure by reserving its right to 
act outside the UN, at the head of what American officials called a coalition of the 
willing. This tone was particularly emboldened by the words of Donald Rumsfeld in an 
early 2003, the mission determines the coalition, not the coalition the mission (Bell 
2003, 223). Such unwitting declarations have contributed to the rising divergence 
between the US and its European allies.   
Particularly, the political leaderships in France and Germany appeared alienated (Bell 
2003, 223), needless to mention from Russia and Chinas (both permanent members of 
the UN Security Council) breeding concerns about American international involvements 
for decades. At the end, not surprisingly, this unilateralist and assertive tone brought the 
US President George W. Bush and his administration to the point of standing virtually 
alone among the nations of the world with respect to the question of what to do about 
Iraq. As an additional consequence of the failure to build consensus among any of the 
permanent members Washington and London also failed in their bid to enlist the 
support of eight non-permanent members  Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, 
Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan and Syria  thus the humiliating withdrawal of the resolution 
(Hamill 2003, 8). Consequently, the second step of increased pressure of the Bush 
strategy did not produce anything like the result advocated by the hardliners in the Bush 
administration, namely authorization for military action. As this breakdown becomes 
increasingly obvious, the Bush administration further underlined its right for unilateral 
    
military action. Nevertheless, this assertiveness only raised the tension in international 
community, and thus brought no benefit for the administration to acquire the 
international legitimacy trigger to use its overwhelming military might. As the success 
of coercive diplomacy that underpins the Bush strategy depends on Saddams belief that 
the threats will be carried out, and that his leadership is at stake, he might be 
calculating that the French and Russian divergence from American and British course 
will work in his favor (Reed 2002, 7). Undoubtedly, such divergence contributed to 
prolong his non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. As a result, 
legally speaking, the power of the US to coerce Saddam for unconditional and 
immediate compliance, let alone to go to exile, had tremendously eroded in the absence 
of the UN authorization for military action. As this fact becomes apparent, the 
beginning of the end for the ineffective American coercive diplomacy left its place for 
the coming US-led war against Saddam Hussein.  Evidently, this will not be the one 
without significant political costs for the US. As James Hamill points out, military 
operations that take place outside the confines of the United Nations (UN) Charter will 
always carry a political price and Operation Iraqi Freedom is likely to be no different. 
(Hamill 2003, 7). Therefore, additionally, the lack of international support detrimentally 
affects the third condition for success (i.e., threaten to defeat adversary with little cost) 
through increasing the political costs of unilateral military action for the Bush 
administration. In that regard, the impact of a single condition of success on the overall 
course of coercive diplomacy can be observed.  Although the success or failure of 
coercive diplomacy can be regarded as temporary processes, their repercussions may 
involve long-term drawbacks for future American involvements. Andrew Moravscsik 
underlined such an element of risk for the long-term US strategy of international 
involvement as the failure to cauterize and contain disputes such as that over Iraq 
threatens all of this [transatlantic] cooperation, as would any deliberate US strategy of 
trying to weaken or divide international organizations like the UN, the EU, or NATO 
(Moravscsik 2003, 4). As a final point, as long as the US preserves its unilateral 
persistence, coercive diplomacy in Iraq may not be the only failure. Regardless of the 
success of military operation in Iraq, the lack of international legitimacy, let alone 
consensus would contribute to nothing but anti-Americanism. This fact is particularly 
emphasized for the Arab world by James Hamill, as the launching of an illegal war 
will seriously complicate the war against terrorism and will help to foster a climate in 
which more young people throughout the Arab world will be receptive to the crude anti-
    
Western rhetoric of terrorist groups.(Hamill 2003, 9). Therefore, by triggering the 
absence of international cooperation, the unilateralist tone of the administration tends to 
generate counter-productive, if not detrimental outcomes to its overall declared strategy 
of countering terrorism. 
 
8) Assurance against future demands  
 Although in the original strategy of coercive diplomacy assurance against 
future demands implies to assure the adversary under concern (i.e., Iraq under 
Saddams regime), in the Second Gulf War, the Bush administration did not feel the 
need to do so. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the administration refrained from 
giving any guarantees at all. Since, the international consensus was indispensable to 
maintain the legitimacy of American military action, the Bush administration was 
convinced that if any assurance should be given, it should be to international 
community as long as it supports its course of coercive diplomacy. In the early phases 
of his involvement, the US President G.W. Bush underlined the assurance of his 
administration in his appeal to the UN on the 12 September 2002, the purposes of the 
United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced 
-- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable 
(Bush addresses U.N. on Iraq, Sept.12, 2002). This assurance appeared to convince the 
UN Security Council to vote unanimously for the UN Security Council Resolution 
#1441, until followed by ever increasing unilateral, interventionist tone and its 
repercussions. Undoubtedly, growing unilateralist tendencies within the administration 
deliberately overlooked the assurance against international community, let alone to 
Saddam himself. Consequently, in his speech of 26 Feb. 2003 to the American 
Enterprise Institute, G.W. Bush gave a clear, firm, public indication that he had 
decided that nothing less than regime change would do (Bell 2003, 222). This 
statement was the end for all assurances, and indeed the beginning of the end for 
Saddam Hussein and his regime.  
 
9) Use of carrot 
 Although, the use of carrot is rather a complementary condition that enhances 
the prospect of success for coercive diplomacy, the Bush administration did not feel the 
need to introduce such condition with regards to Saddam Hussein. Indeed, this belief 
was not surprising, since the Bush administration had declared its commitment to topple 
    
down his regime. Therefore, the preferred post-conflict relationship with the adversary 
was never the one of co-existence, let alone cooperation. To this end, the absence of any 
carrots was in line with the overall strategy of the Bush administration, although this 
strategy produces little comprehensive success, if any, in terms of the effectiveness of 
multilateral coercive diplomacy.    
 
Conclusion 
 Each of the success conditions for coercive diplomacy has been analyzed in 
accordance with the cases concerned. During this study, each of the conditions for 
success is examined in line with its credence to the overall strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. For that reason, some conditions are more detailed in the analysis of one of 
the cases, while others can be more brief in nature, and vice versa due to their varying 
influence in the each case. As a consequence, having analyzed the success conditions 
for coercive diplomacy with regards to each of the respected cases and highlighted the 
pertinent factual data and its remarks, now the ground is laid out for drawing together 
significant findings and conclusions as a result of such comparison. Chapter 5 concludes 
the study, offering comparative remarks to the cases and indeed more critically to the 
effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in the emerging world order.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Chapter 5 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
Coercive diplomacy is not a panacea that will solve all international crises, but it does 
provide the chance to achieve political objectives with little or no bloodshed. 
   David W. Angle9   
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of this comparative case analysis in reference to the conditions 
favoring the successful use of coercive diplomacy, the stage becomes ready for 
assessing the comparative findings and drawing conclusions. Accordingly, this part is 
organized under two main categories in order to facilitate explanation of the findings, 
and to come up with the further implications of this study. The grouping is as follows: 
A - Comparative Findings 
B - Conclusions and Implications 
 In part A, the direct findings from the comparative analysis in Chapter 4 are 
outlined and explained. Table 5-1 is designed with the aim of facilitating the 
comparative analysis and illustrating differences between the cases with regards to the 
conditions favoring successful use of coercive diplomacy.  Thus, this part constitutes 
the essential core of comparative analysis. Akin to the model followed in Chapter 4, 
part A explains findings with reference to each condition for the successful use of 
coercive diplomacy. It should be kept in mind that since this part aims to present with 
the comparative findings from both of the cases, only the conditions became the 
reference point in combining the cases. Therefore, findings with regards to both of the 
cases are blended with theoretical premises to reveal the converging and diverging 
elements in the cases under concern.   
 In the conclusions and implications part, the primary objective is to put forward 
the lessons learned from this study. In line with the first part, the similar flow is put into 
practice in a manner that first introduces the conclusions point by point, and then 
elaborates on their substantiation with reference to the cases and their further 
implications for the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy.  
  
                                                 
9 David W. Angle, <http://www.stormingmedia.us/60/6020/A602073.html> [cited on 7/5/2004].   
    
A - Comparative Findings 
 
Table 5-1: The Summary of Comparative Findings according to the Conditions 
Favoring Successful Use of Coercive Diplomacy. 
 
Presence (+)/Absence (-) of the CFSUCD Conditions  
Favoring  
Successful  
Use of  
Coercive  
Diplomacy (CFSUCD) 
Bosnian War 
 (1992-1995) 
 
Second Gulf War 
(2002-2003) 
1) Clear demand 
 
+  
2) Use of ultimatum 
 
+  
3) Threaten to defeat the 
      adversary with little cost 
+  
4) Usable military options 
 
+ + 
5) Strong leadership 
 
+  
6) Domestic support 
 
+  
7) International support 
 
+  
8) Assurance against       
      future demands 
+  
9) Use of carrot 
 
+  
 
 
 
 
    
1) Clear Demand 
Given the apparent dissimilarity of the cases, the divergence of fulfillment of 
success conditions for coercive diplomacy is far from being surprising. Beginning with 
an explicit difference in the clarity of demands between both cases also signals that such 
divergence will remain, if not deepen in the comparative analysis of the following 
conditions. The Clarity of demands is vital for the overall strategy of coercive 
diplomacy, since the demands concerned are introductory moves for the coercers 
engagement that can be hardly compensated in the later phases. In that regard, it can be 
argued that during the entire course of the Second Gulf War (2002-2003) preceding the 
war, the evolution of the Bush strategy, from disarmament to regime change with the 
aim of assuring the full-compliance, lost momentum due to the lack of clarity of its 
demand. On the other hand, it can be traced that although reluctant at the beginning, the 
coercing coalition remained as clear as possible in its demands during the overall course 
of the Bosnian War (1992-1995). To give an example from the most reluctant, thus 
vaguer period of the Western involvement on 2 August 1993, NATO threatened to 
undertake immediate preparations for stronger measures, including air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs if the strangulation of Sarajevo continued (Jakobsen 1998, 91). 
Unlike in the case of the Bosnian War, the US failed to convince even its allies as to the 
viability of its demands with regards to Iraq (i.e., regime change to assure full 
compliance of Saddam with existing UN Security Council resolutions, and thus his 
complete disarmament). Such discrepancy can be attributed particularly to lack of 
clarity and specificity of the demands of the Bush Administration to both the adversary 
(i.e., Saddam Hussein) and the international community of which it needs at least the 
support for legitimating the US-led war against Iraq.     On the contrary, the principal 
coercing coalition of Western governments under the UN and NATO framework 
specified their demands, and such specificity added credibility to their threats for non-
compliance against the Bosnian Serbs. To compensate this lack of clarity and specificity 
the Bush Administration stepped forward by starting to demand another UN resolution 
to authorize the use of force, in the case of prolonged, incomplete Iraqi compliance. The 
underlying motive of this demand from international community was to equip the 
principal coercer (i.e., the US) with adequate means to exercise its projected threat in 
case of non-compliance. Thus, in the end, the US constructed an image that promised 
little support, if any, from the international community in the manner that its sole 
demand was the UN authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Undoubtedly, these 
    
critical discrepancies in the opening phases of the strategy for both cases bring about the 
reasons for great divergence in the remaining conditions for the success of coercive 
diplomacy. 
 
2) Use of Ultimatum 
Given the interrelatedness of the conditions for success, complexities in the very 
first condition (i.e., clear demand) have complicated the use of ultimatum in the Second 
Gulf War. Thus, not surprisingly, the absence of clear demand in the Second Gulf War 
by the principal coercer (i.e. the US) translated to the ambiguous strategy orientation. 
To be more specific, in the Bosnian War, the ultimatums were issued for the specific 
limited ends that are agreed by the UN and carried out by NATO. On the other hand, in 
the case of Iraq, the constant threat of unilateral action by the Bush Administration was 
neither specific in terms of its time constraint and of the conditions triggering unilateral 
American action nor indicating any consensus in the international realm. Accordingly, 
such an absence of clarity in the overall strategy of the Bush Administration might have 
contributed to worldwide distrust to recent American policies in the Gulf, thus feeding 
the sentiment for non-compliance within Iraq under Saddams rule. Therefore, needless 
to say, the US was unable to attain complete compliance to the UN Security Council 
resolutions. The ultimatums proved to be effective as long as the adversary has been 
convinced that they will be carried out. To this end, NATO resorted to exemplary use of 
force against the Bosnian Serbs, to demonstrate its resolution. On the other hand, the 
Bush Administration fell short of coupling its strategy with exemplary and effective 
coercive measures. Although ever-increasing American military built up in the Gulf 
could be regarded as such a signal, this might well be regarded as an American pressure 
bluff that tends to be called by Saddam. The inadequacy of full-fledged ultimatum until 
the very end (i.e., 24 hours before the all-out war) of the crisis remained the primary 
shortcoming of an American strategy aiming effectiveness through coercive diplomacy. 
Whereas in the Bosnian War, most ultimatums (if not all) were full fledged although 
they were limited in their scope. Perhaps, since their implementation required consensus 
between the EU and the US at least, they were very specific and limited. For sure, this 
was essential in the Gulf as well but apparently lacking.  The elaboration of the 
presence (and/or absence) of the remaining conditions will further comparative analysis.   
 
 
    
3) Threaten to defeat the adversary with little cost  
 The Western indecisiveness to generate credible threats that can be carried out at 
reasonable costs led to the continuation of the Serbian aggression in the early phases of 
the Bosnian War. Although entailing different concerns, similar uncertainty has been 
experienced during the entire course of the Second Gulf War. Again the Americans 
were on the side of the decisive military action, while the Europeans were the doves of 
the day leaning more on a wait and see policy.  Nevertheless, the fact is that the Gulf 
is far from the immediate neighborhood of Europe and the ever-increasing unilateral 
tone of the Bush administration fueled European reluctance with few exceptions such as 
the UK, Spain, and Italy. In the Second Gulf War, it is of particular importance that the 
principal US allies that had contributed to finance the First Gulf War in the early 1990s 
demonstrated such similar resistance. According to Bell, The costs of invasion and 
occupation were estimated at about 132 billion US Dollars, and Germany and Japan 
were not willing or able to help fund those costs as they had been in 1991 (Bell 2003, 
229).  Thus, although the US maintained its capacity to deliver and execute credible 
threats such as occupying the entire country to topple down Saddams regime, the 
absence of international consensus tend to reveal itself as mounting burden for the costs 
of the war.  Coming back to Bosnia the inevitability of taking action for the Europeans 
contributed to their willingness to cooperate with the Americans. Europeans had the 
peacekeepers on the ground, and later deployed Rapid Reaction Force, while the 
Americans constituted the backbone of the air campaign, and maintained Bosnian 
Croats and Muslims front united to fight against the Serbs on the ground. As a result, all 
of the costs -political, economic, and military- were shared in the Bosnian War, and 
accordingly the coercer (i.e.: the Contact Group) was able to threaten to defeat the 
adversary with little cost. Whereas in the Second Gulf War, such opportunity has been 
missed from the very beginning. Perhaps thats why many have labeled it as the US-led 
war against Iraq, since the burden remains on the US. So far, this burden has not 
provided any clue that the adversary has been defeated with little cost.  
 
4) Usable military options  
Although in both of the cases the United States possessed military capabilities 
far superior to those of the adversaries (i.e., the Bosnian Serbs, Saddam Husseins 
regime), military assets do not translate evenly into usable military options. Apparently 
this fact seems better comprehended by the Clinton administration than the current Bush 
    
administration. With the aim of translating its superior military capabilities into usable 
military options to the service of coercive diplomacy the Clinton administration 
refrained from any active involvement till the later phases of the Bosnian War from 
mid-1994 to late 1995. During this period, the US embarked on the decisive air strikes 
in an unprecedented manner, of which only after its use, the Bosnian Serbs could be 
persuaded to cease their aggression and negotiate for the settlement. Furthermore, the 
Clinton administration encouraged the formation of complementary military options 
such as the Rapid Reaction Force with the aim of not only sharing the burden of the 
war, but also to mobilizing international (i.e.: European) cooperation through usable 
military options. The result was the translation of political resolution and international 
consensus to the ground effectiveness, whereas such translation could not be regarded 
as something more than a mismatch in case of the Second Gulf War.  In the Second 
Gulf War, the Bush administration offered nothing more than a threat of all-out 
unilateral war. Thus, although the US possessed usable military options, in the hands of 
the Bush administration, they were more conducive towards a full-fledged war rather 
than coercive purposes. Even so, this fourth condition still remains the only one that 
exists in both cases. Although the leading coercer (i.e.: the US) remains the same in 
terms of its military might and thus availability (if not abundance) of usable military 
options, its ability to transform them into acceptable effective instruments of coercive 
diplomacy proves to be much curtailed due to the Bush administrations lacking strong 
leadership, and thus inability to attain domestic and international support.      
 
5) Strong Leadership  
The essence of strong leadership remains critical in orchestrating the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy, and gathering domestic and international support to assure its 
effective maintenance. To this end, having strong leadership becomes the initial 
condition of consensus building to acquire and sustain domestic and international 
support for any coercive effort. According to Art, If the coercers top-level decision 
makers do not provide consistently strong leadership, then the coercers message can 
become disjointed, clarity in objectives can be lost, and sufficient domestic and 
international support will not be forthcoming (Art 2003, 371). Thus, the shortcomings 
of the leading state or group of states can jeopardize the success of coercive diplomacy 
through curbing the vital domestic and international support indispensable for its 
adequate implementation. The series of such shortcomings came when the Bush 
    
administration handled the Second Gulf Crisis in an unprecedented unilateral fashion. 
Thus, the Bush administration has confused strong leadership with unilateralism. 
Undoubtedly, this overemphasis on unilateralism brought reaction rather than support, 
and therefore exposed the strategy of coercive diplomacy in the Gulf to be regarded as 
nothing more than an illegitimate US war by many. On the other hand, unlike the Bush 
administrations top-to-bottom imposing tone, the Clinton administration pioneered the 
evolution of strong leadership with regards to the Western involvement in the Bosnian 
War. First, refraining from active engagement till April 1994 allowed the Europeans 
experience the futility of their bewildering diplomatic interplays. After that, the US took 
the lead through not only attaining political support for its involvement, but also 
through admitting most of the costs associated with it. Moreover, remarkably the 
Clinton administration embarked heavily on multilateralism while orchestrating 
coercive diplomacy under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and finally the Contact 
Group. Undoubtedly, the Clinton administrations aptitude to master multilateral 
support for its involvement contributed to the success of the coercive diplomacy in 
gaining domestic and international support. 
 
6) Domestic Support 
Given the interdependence between domestic and international policies, the 
essence of domestic support remains critical in maintaining an effective coercive 
diplomacy. If the coercers leadership lacks adequate domestic support for its policies, 
then it will not be able to sustain them (Art 2003, 367). Thus, in order to maintain the 
strategy of coercive diplomacy the coercer needs to sustain (if not to increase) adequate 
level of domestic support. As a result of widespread coverage of Serbian atrocities in 
Bosnia by Western media, the Western public opinion constituted a rising pressure on 
the decision-makers to intervene with the aim of halting Serbian aggression. 
Furthermore, public opinion on the both sides of the Atlantic was also supporting air 
strikes as the principal coercive instruments to induce Serbian compliance, due to their 
effective and low-risk, low-casualty profiles. Therefore, in Yugoslavia, the will to 
threaten and use force was primarily domestic driven (Jakobsen 1998, 136). As 
opposed to the Bosnian War, domestic support tended to have a declining trend in case 
of the Second Gulf War. In that regard, it should be particularly underlined that even the 
already existing American public support for the Bush administration in the aftermath 
of 9/11 was increasingly contingent upon the UN authorization. Thus, beyond merely 
    
having domestic support or not, the consideration of the nature of domestic support is of 
critical importance. Therefore, the essence of qualifying the nature and conditions for 
domestic support emerged as one of the key points towards theoretical refinement as 
well. For that reason the absence of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the 
use of force increased war-resisting protests, and considerable anti-war public opinion 
began to divert the already fragile international consent (let alone support) for the US-
led war against Iraq. Therefore, because the unilateralist approach of the Bush 
administration has proved to be counter-productive in the international realm, such 
drawback was not going to give any prospective signals towards acquiring domestic 
support.  
 
7) International Support 
International support is not only vital in rising domestic public opinion behind 
the strategy of coercive diplomacy but also constitutes a critical ingredient for the 
maintenance of the overall effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. If it [the coercer] lacks 
adequate international support then, its actions could be easily frustrated or undermined 
by other states (Art 2003, 371). This fact proved to be particularly influential in 
rendering the coercive diplomacy of the Bush administration towards Iraq fruitless. 
Since the claim of the Bush administration was to pressure Iraq for the sake of 
preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and countering 
terrorism, claims which both need ever-more international cooperation to be sustained 
at global level. International support once again confirmed that it was a condition of 
which its absence has proved to be the most detrimental.  Indeed, the Bush 
administration underestimated, if not overlooked, the impact of international support on 
the success of coercive diplomacy and subsequent war should it fail. Instead of seeking 
consensus, and then pushing hard for international support as did the Clinton 
administration in the Bosnian War, the Bush administration came up with an idea called 
a coalition of the willing that tended to alienate the states concerned about the 
American unilateralism. Unfortunately, such an assertive policy of the Bush 
administration fueled these concerns and exacerbated divergence in the major 
international organizations where the US takes the lead, such as NATO and the UN. At 
the end, neither of them was unanimously on the American side, but they were rather 
diverted and frustrated about the lack of American consideration for their jurisdiction. 
To be more specific, the fact that NATO was behind the US as a whole in Bosnia 
    
should be underlined, whereas in the Second Gulf War the Alliance was polarized in 
case for whether to support the US-led War against Iraq or not. Undoubtedly, this 
polarization exacerbated the divergence in principal organizations of Western 
multilateral involvement such as the EU and UN. Thus, in the absence of international 
legitimacy (i.e.: lacking UN authorization for military action) the American power to 
coerce Saddam for unconditional and immediate compliance crumbled enormously. 
Whereas in the Bosnian War the disagreement among the Western governments was 
more on how to use force rather than whether to use it or not, unlike in the Second Gulf 
War, domestic public opinions on the both sides of the Atlantic pressured their 
governments to agree on the common course of action and hammer out the agreed 
policy to stop the Serbian aggression. As a result, international support proved to be the 
most critical condition in attaining the effectiveness of the Western coercive diplomacy 
in the Bosnian War, whereas its absence complicated the remaining conditions for 
success in the Second Gulf War. 
  
8) Assurance against future demands  
Since the strategy of coercive diplomacy aims to manipulate the adversarys 
behavior in a desired manner, the adversary has to be assured by the coercer that its 
compliance will not lead to more demands. As Robert Art argues, Credibility 
considerations make compromise difficult enough for the target because they involve 
the following sorts of issues: if the target gives way on this matter, will this be the 
coercers last demand, or is it only the first in series of demands? (Art 2003, 366). In 
the Second Gulf War the Bush administration (principal coercer) had never felt such 
need to assure Saddam (principal adversary) against future demands. On the contrary, 
the Bush administration underlined its self-declared option of unilateral military 
intervention to topple down Saddams regime. Thus, it is not possible to talk at all about 
any assurances of the US towards the adversary (i.e. Saddam) in the Second Gulf War. 
On the other hand, in the Bosnian War, the Clinton administration followed a 
consensual path in line with the conditions favoring successful use of coercive 
diplomacy. One of these conditions was, according to Art, the target may demand 
assurances from the coercer that it will meet its obligations under the bargained 
agreement (Art 371, 2003). This agreement was the Dayton Peace signed in Ohio, 
USA in November 1995, ending the Bosnian War with assurances not only to the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats, but also to the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, assurance 
    
against future demands encourages adversary cooperation, and facilitates negotiation for 
the lasting settlement. 
 
9) Use of carrot 
The findings with regards to the final condition for success of coercive 
diplomacy confirm the maxim of the literature from previous studies,  all other things 
being equal, the target should be more likely to comply with the coercers demands if it 
is offered positive inducements in addition to coercion (Art 2003, 388). Thus, the use 
of carrot is of rather a complementary nature, but never negligible. Particularly, in 
gaining the cooperation of the behind the scenes parties to the conflict. The Bosnian 
War confirms this argument in a manner that the US offered to lift the embargo to 
Serbia proper with the aim of attaining Milosevics (the leader of the Serbia proper and 
principal supporter of the Bosnian Serbs) support for the peace settlement.  As Ivo 
Daalder puts forward in the Bosnian case Milosevic wanted sanctions lifted, and 
amorphous promises to lift them were apparently made as early as September 1995 
(quoted in Art 393, 2003). Nevertheless, it should not be disregarded that positive 
inducements are likely to be most effective in those cases in which the target does not 
place the value of its goal above all its other interests. For instance, Bosnia was not as 
crucial for Milosevic as being the sole ruler of Iraq was for Saddam.  Thus, the fact that 
defending his regime is of utmost importance for Saddam made him not receptive 
towards use of carrots, if any. Since from the First Gulf War onwards, the Anglo-
American approach towards Saddam was the one of formidable stick rather than any 
carrot at all, it was unlikely, if not impossible, for Saddam to get any form of positive 
inducement. This difficulty in offering carrots in coercive diplomacy is emphasized by 
Jakobsen: the scope for offering carrots may sometimes be very limited. This problem 
was underlined by the British and American governments during the Gulf conflict that 
Saddam Hussein did not deserve any carrots (Jakobsen 140, 1998). Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the increasingly unilateralist Bush administration was in no position to 
appreciate any value to use carrots to assure compliance of Saddam. However, if history 
is any guide, even if the unilateralist intervention can attain short-term military victory, 
the coercer will have to give some sort of positive inducements to maintain its rule over 
Iraq in the long-term.  
    
 
B - Conclusions and Implications 
Since the presence of these conditions does not guarantee success (Freedman 
84, 1998), and emerging cases of coercive diplomacy requires further elaboration, the 
following conclusions are the outcome of this comparative analysis that fall beyond the 
categories of the comparative findings. These are also the implications that need to be 
considered in improving the abstract model of coercive diplomacy as well as in adapting 
the strategy of coercive diplomacy to the emerging conflicts.   
 
1. Combining diplomacy with force is more effective than either diplomacy or force 
alone 
2. The best way of preserving peace is to prepare to use force in an enduring manner 
3. Military superiority does not guarantee success 
4. Multilateral use of coercive diplomacy complicates its effective accomplishment 
5. The impact of international organizations goes beyond legitimation 
6. Need for new political and military doctrines to use force in support of diplomacy 
 
1.Combining diplomacy with force is more effective than either diplomacy or force 
alone 
If this study is going to have any grand conclusion, it should be the first one. 
This first conclusion is not the lesson that solely belongs to this study but rather the 
underlying logic and founding basis of coercive diplomacy. Indeed, this fundamental 
conclusion is inspired from the words of Tanter and Psarouthakis when they describe 
the theory; coercive diplomacy suggests that the combination of diplomacy with force 
is more effective than either employing diplomacy or force alone (Tanter and 
Psarouthakis 1999, 58). 
In view of this premise, the cases under concern confirm this founding argument of 
coercive diplomacy in a complementary manner. For example, in the early phases of the 
Bosnian War (1992-1994) diplomacy alone proved ineffective. The Bosnian Serbs 
continued to defy the early UN and EC mediation attempts since they did not regard the 
international community as a powerful actor that can have a say so over the Bosnian 
War. 
On the other hand, in the Second Gulf War (2002-2003), flexing military muscle 
alone (even though overwhelming) led to the failure of the strategy of coercive 
    
diplomacy. Thus, military superiority alone proved to be ineffective in attaining the 
compliance of the adversary, short of war. Adamantly unilateralist to of the Bush 
administration failed to acquire international legitimacy, let alone support. 
Undoubtedly, this virtual isolation of the Bush administration contributed to the 
adversarys (i.e.: Saddam Hussein) intransigence. Therefore, the cases together support 
this conclusion in a complementary manner.   
 
2. The best way of preserving peace is to prepare to use force in an enduring 
manner 
Unlike the old dictum that the best way of preserving peace is to prepare for 
war (Freedman 84, 1998), this study stresses on the need to prepare to use force in an 
enduring manner. The Second Gulf War revealed the fact that if states prepare to go all-
out war, they have a tendency to fulfill their preparedness. Nevertheless, such readiness 
does not mean that the preparedness to use force is trivial. On the contrary, possessing 
the preparedness to use force in an enduring manner, while denying the counter-
escalation by the adversary is critical for the success of coercive diplomacy. This vital 
notion of the preparedness to use force was demonstrated during NATOs Operation 
Deliberate Force against the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian Serbs had 
experienced the might of NATOs air power, they waited for a while to check the 
endurance of this might, only after a certain while of NATO bombing did they agreed to 
sign the Dayton Peace Accords. Therefore, the demonstration of such preparedness is 
critical in attaining the credibility of the coercer, which is indispensable for 
accomplishing any kind of compliance. As James Gow argues to make coercion 
effective, the intent of the coercer must be made credible to the coercee (Freedman 
291, 1998). However, one should keep in mind that the preparedness to use force in an 
enduring manner means much more than military build up in the region concerned. 
Endurance here refers to use force in an internationally acceptable manner as well. 
Otherwise, the adversary may comply partially at best with the aim of exploiting 
divergence in the international community on the course of action to seize its non-
compliance.  As a result, the success of coercive diplomacy depends heavily on the 
ability to establish and sustain an enduring operational and diplomatic preparedness to 
use force. 
 
 
    
3. Military superiority does not guarantee success 
Although, the preparedness to use force is of critical importance, it promises 
little success if it is used in an isolated manner. Military superiority is essential in 
attaining the adversary compliance in a cost effective, low risk, and low casualty 
manner. This was particularly exemplified during the effective American involvement 
in the Bosnian War without any troops on the ground. However, the same muscle 
tended to be inadequate alone in coercing Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN 
Security Council resolutions unconditionally and immediately. Thus, the opposing 
outcomes of the cases (i.e.: success and failure) confirmed the point that military 
superiority is no assurance for success, given the principal coercer (i.e.: the US) was the 
same in both of the cases. This conclusion constitutes particularly a warning signal 
towards American policymakers, the United States should never bank on the fact that 
being militarily stronger automatically brings victory in coercive diplomatic encounters 
as the way it can in wars (Art 408, 2003). 
4. Multilateral use of coercive diplomacy complicates its effective accomplishment 
In the cases where there is a coalition of coercers, even if the coalition may be 
united in its overall goal, it can be divided over the means to achieve the goal.  This was 
the case for the ineffectiveness of the Western involvement in the Bosnian War. 
Everybody agreed that Serbian aggression needs to be seized, but there was no common 
ground regarding the mean till the very end on the war. The Americans advocated 
decisive air strikes while the Europeans were more in a containing and wavering mood. 
Given this divergence in the early phases of the Western involvement, the Bosnian 
Serbs continued to overlook the international community for a while even after the 
Americans declared their seriousness. Thus, actions taken to hold the coalition together 
can degrade the military and diplomatic effectiveness of the coercive attempt (Art 367, 
2003). Furthermore, the coalition itself can be a target of the adversary to divert the 
limited international support from the principal coercer. This was the case for the 
Second Gulf War when radical groups declared that the ones cooperating with the 
Americans will also be punished, and this threat was followed by the assault to Spanish 
force in the Gulf, for instance. For that reason, Coalitional use of coercive diplomacy is 
exceedingly difficult as the various coalition members will often assess the threat posed 
by an opponent differently and thus find it hard to agree on the necessity of adopting the 
high-risk ultimatum strategy that as a rule will be required for success (Freedman 85, 
1998) 
    
5. The impact of international organizations goes beyond legitimation 
Unlike traditional wisdom, which claims that international organizations exist 
for the mere sake of legitimizing the actions of great powers, this study underlines 
further utilities of international organizations in facilitating consensus building and 
coordinating coercive efforts. To this end, the primary function of international 
organizations in contributing to the success of coercive diplomacy is that the impact of 
international organizations went beyond legitimation as their presence occasionally 
induced states to do something they would not otherwise have done (Jakobsen 138, 
1998). To be more specific, British interest in preserving NATO as the principal 
security organization in Europe was the decisive factor in persuading the British 
government to support the strong ultimatum issued to the Serbs in February 1994 
(Jakobsen 138, 1998). Thus, alongside the prestige of the states themselves, the 
reputation of international organizations (i.e.: NATO) that they value is crucial in 
attaining alliance coherence during coercive diplomacy. 
  
6. Need for new political and military doctrines to use force in support of 
diplomacy 
Given the fact the success hinges on a capability and willingness to use force 
(Freedman 84, 1998), the need for new political and military doctrines is apparent. Such 
inevitability stems particularly from the fact that effective crisis diplomacy needs to be 
backed by threats and the use of force, highlights the need to develop new military 
doctrines allowing Western forces to threaten and use limited force in support of 
diplomatic efforts (Jakobsen 144, 1998). This final conclusion, which encompasses 
also the elements of projection for the future of coercive diplomacy, does merely entail 
the formulation of new doctrines for the excessive use of force. On the contrary, it also 
offers a vision of restricting the use of all-out force against an adversary, while 
underlining the need for international mechanisms of decision making for the effective 
international involvements to humanitarian emergencies, such as the one in Bosnia. As 
Jakobsen points out, the Western powers could have stopped both conflicts [i.e., 
Bosnia] earlier if they had been willing to back their diplomacy with force (Jakobsen 
141, 1998). Therefore, the study emphasizes to the need to develop more effective 
doctrinal and institutional frameworks for using the force in a coercive and limited 
manner rather than in an all-out war manner. The absence of such international 
mechanisms coupled with the assertive policies pave the way to the failure of coercive 
    
attempts, and thus leads the conflict to all-out warfare. The Second Gulf War constitutes 
the most recent example of that kind, which has been clearly demonstrating the 
inadequacy of current doctrines and institutional networks in addressing the 
contemporary problems of international community such as the increasingly widespread 
terrorism, and even more horrifying, the conduct of terrorism through weapons of mass 
destruction.   
 
Conclusion 
 Emerging challenges of contemporary world require fresh outlooks based on 
reason, humanity and applicability. Studying coercive diplomacy becomes the quest in 
these lines. Although, the phenomenon is not a brand new one, it is open for tailoring 
and improvement from the very beginning. In this light, this study gathers as much as 
from the emerging literature on coercive diplomacy such as Jakobsen, Freedman, and 
Art as much as it did from its founding father Alexander L. George.  
 Bringing a comparative dimension into an usual case study analysis constitutes 
another characteristic of this study. Analyzing the very recent Second Gulf War, with no 
precedent of detailed analysis in coercive diplomacy, constitutes a challenge. 
Nevertheless, the one to be carried out to examine the theory of coercive diplomacy in 
emerging world order, like the old wine in new bottles. Once more, to reveal the limits 
of theory when it comes to practice, and our limits when it comes to explain. 
 Undoubtedly this quest of academic rigor reveals opportunities and prospects for 
coercive diplomacy as much as it does for the limits. For that reason, the final chapter of 
the thesis remains of particular importance in outlining the lessons learned from this 
study through drawing conclusions from the comparative analysis. After comparatively 
analyzing the cases in accordance with the conditions favoring successful use of 
coercive diplomacy in Chapter 4, this final chapter draws comparative findings in line 
with Chapter 4, and further elaborates on the conclusions and implications of this study. 
Given the ever-dynamic nature of world politics, the new challenges will keep on 
calling for new strategies to deal with them. In view of the fact that there is no way to 
envisage all of the challenges on the horizon, studying the effectiveness of employing 
coercive diplomacy is not only essential, but will be an ongoing, evolving process. 
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